BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, AUG 19 AM 11 55

DELAWARE P.S.C.

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF)	
DELMARVA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY FOR)	PSC DOCKET NO. 13-115
AN INCREASE IN ELECTRIC BASE RATES)	
(Filed March 22, 2013))	

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

DAVID C. PARCELL

PRESIDENT

TECHNICAL ASSOCIATES, INC.

ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE

AUGUST 16, 2013

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INTRODUCTION

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- 2 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
- 3 A. My name is David C. Parcell. I am President and Senior Economist of Technical
- Associates, Inc. My business address is Suite 580, 9030 Stony Point Parkway,
- 5 Richmond, Virginia 23235.
- 6 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND
- 7 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE.
- 8 A. I hold B.A. (1969) and M.A. (1970) degrees in economics from Virginia Polytechnic
- Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) and a M.B.A. (1985) from Virginia
- 10 Commonwealth University. I have been a consulting economist with Technical
- 11 Associates since 1970. I have provided cost of capital testimony in public utility
- ratemaking proceedings dating back to 1972. In connection with this, I have previously
- filed testimony and/or testified in about 500 utility proceedings before about 50
- regulatory agencies in the United States and Canada. Attachment 1 provides a more
- 15 complete description of my education and relevant work experience.
- 16 Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THIS COMMISSION?
- 17 A. Yes, I have. Since 1997, I have testified in approximately 20 public utility proceedings
- before this Commission, all on behalf of the Commission Staff. Several of these
- proceedings were Delmarva Power & Light Co. ("DP&L") rate proceedings.

1 PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY

2 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCE	'EEDING?
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- 3 A. My testimony, which I have prepared on behalf of the Division of the Public Advocate
- 4 ("DPA"), evaluates the cost of capital ("COC") relative to the current filing of DP&L. I
- have performed independent studies and am making recommendations of the current
- 6 COC for DP&L. In addition, because DP&L is a subsidiary of Pepco Holdings, Inc.
- 7 ("PHI"), I also have considered this entity in my risk assessment and analyses of the
- 8 Company.

9 RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY

- 10 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR COC ANALYSES AND RELATED
- 11 CONCLUSIONS FOR DP&L.
- 12 A. This proceeding is concerned with DP&L's regulated electric utility operations in
- Delaware. My analyses address the Company's COC. My overall COC
- recommendations for DP&L are shown on Exhibit DCP-1 and are summarized below:

15		Percent	Cost	Return
16	Long-Term Debt	50.78%	4.91%	2.49%
10	Common Equity	49.22%	9.20-9.50%	4.53-4.68%
17	Total	100.00%		7.02-7.17%
				7 09% Mid-Point

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- DP&L's application requests a return on common equity ("COE") of 10.25% and overall
- COC of 7.53%. I propose a COE of 9.35% and an overall COC of 7.09%.

The first step in performing an analysis of the Company's cost of capital is the development of the appropriate capital structure. DP&L's proposed capital structure is comprised of 50.78% long-term debt and 49.22% common equity, which represents the Company's actual capital structure ratios as of December 31, 2012. I use this capital structure in my COC analyses.

The second step in a COC calculation is a determination of the embedded cost of long-term debt. DP&L's application uses a cost of 4.91% for long-term debt which reflects the Company's embedded cost at December 31, 2012. I use this rate in my analyses.

The third step in the COC calculation is the estimation of the COE. I have employed three recognized methodologies to estimate the COE for DP&L. Each of these methodologies is applied to two groups of proxy utilities. These three methodologies and my findings are:

	Methodology	Range	Mid-Point
Di	scounted Cash Flow	9.0-9.4%	9.20%
Ca	pital Asset Pricing Model	6.9-7.0%	6.95%
Co	omparable Earnings	9.0-10.0%	9.50%

Based upon these findings, I conclude that the COE for DP&L is within a range of 9.20% to 9.50% (9.35% mid-point). This reflects the mid-point results of my DCF and comparable earnings analyses.

1		Combining these three steps results in an overall COC range of 7.07% to 7.17%.
2		My recommended 9.35% COE results in an overall COC of 7.109%.
3		ECONOMIC/LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGIES
4	Q.	WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES THAT
5		ESTABLISH THE STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING A FAIR RATE OF
6		RETURN FOR A REGULATED UTILITY?
7	Α.	Public utility rates are normally established in a manner designed to allow the recovery of
8		their costs, including capital costs. This is frequently referred to as "cost of service"
9		ratemaking. Rates for regulated public utilities traditionally have been primarily
0		established using the "rate base - rate of return" concept. Under this method, utilities are
1		allowed to recover a level of operating expenses, taxes, and depreciation deemed
2		reasonable for rate-setting purposes, and are granted an opportunity to earn a fair rate of
3		return on the assets used and useful (i.e., rate base) in providing service to their
4		customers.
5		The rate base is derived from the asset side of the utility's balance sheet as a
6		dollar amount and the rate of return is developed from the liabilities/owners' equity side
7		of the balance sheet as a percentage. The revenue impact of the rate of return is thus
8		derived by multiplying the rate base by the rate of return (including income taxes).
9		The rate of return is developed from the COC, which is estimated by weighting
:0		the capital structure components (i.e., debt. preferred stock, and common equity) by their

percentages in the capital structure and multiplying these by their cost rates. This is also known as the weighted COC.

Technically, "fair rate of return" is a legal and accounting concept that refers to an ex post (after the fact) earned return on an asset base, while the COC is an economic and financial concept which refers to an ex ante (before the fact) expected or required return on a liability base. In regulatory proceedings, however, the two terms are often used interchangeably, as I have done in my testimony.

From an economic standpoint, a fair rate of return is normally interpreted to mean that an efficient and economically managed utility will be able to maintain its financial integrity, attract capital, and establish comparable returns for similar risk investments. These concepts are derived from economic and financial theory and are generally implemented using financial models and economic concepts.

Although I am not a lawyer and I do not offer a legal opinion, my testimony is based on my understanding that two United States Supreme Court decisions provide the main standards for a fair rate of return. The first decision is <u>Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of West Virginia</u>, 262 U.S. 679 (1923). In this decision, the Court stated:

What annual rate will constitute just compensation depends upon many circumstances and must be determined by the exercise of fair and enlightened judgment, having regard to all relevant facts. A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same

general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures. The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility, and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties. A rate of return may be reasonable at one time, and become too high or too low by changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money market, and business conditions generally. [Emphasis added.]

It is my understanding that the <u>Bluefield</u> decision established the following standards for a fair rate of return: comparable earnings, financial integrity, and capital attraction. It also noted the changing level of required returns over time as well as an underlying assumption that the utility be operated in an efficient manner.

The second decision is <u>Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.</u>, 320 U.S. 591 (1942). In that decision, the Court stated:

The rate-making process under the [Natural Gas] Act, i.e., the fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor and consumer interests.... From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock. By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital. [Emphasis added.]

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The <u>Hope</u> case is also frequently credited with establishing the "end result" doctrine, which maintains that the methods utilized to develop a fair return are not as important as long as the end result is reasonable.

The three economic and financial parameters in the <u>Bluefield</u> and <u>Hope</u> decisions - comparable earnings, financial integrity, and capital attraction - reflect the economic criteria encompassed in the "opportunity cost" principle of economics. The opportunity-cost principle provides that a utility and its investors should be afforded an opportunity (not a guarantee) to earn a return commensurate with returns they could expect to achieve on investments of similar risk. The opportunity cost principle is consistent with the fundamental premise, on which regulation rests, namely, that it is intended to act as a surrogate for competition.

12 Q. HOW CAN THESE PARAMETERS BE EMPLOYED TO ESTIMATE THE COC 13 FOR A UTILITY?

Neither the courts nor economic/financial theory have developed exact and mechanical procedures for precisely determining the COC. This is the case because the COC is an opportunity cost and is prospective-looking, which dictates that it must be estimated.

There are several useful models that can be employed to assist in estimating the COE, which is the capital structure item that is the most difficult to determine. These include the Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF"), Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), Comparable Earnings ("CE") and Risk Premium ("RP") methods. Each of these methods

1		(or models) differs from the others and each, if properly employed, can be a useful tool in
2		estimating the COE for a regulated utility.
3	Q.	WHICH METHODS HAVE YOU EMPLOYED IN YOUR ANALYSES OF THE
4		COE IN THIS PROCEEDING?
5	A.	I have utilized three methodologies to determine DP&L's COE: the DCF, CAPM, and
6	·	CE methods. I have not employed a RP model in my analyses, although, as I indicate
7		later, my CAPM analysis is a form of the RP methodology. Each of these methodologies
8		will be described in more detail in my testimony that follows.
9	GEN	ERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
10	Q.	ARE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS IMPORTANT IN
11		DETERMINING THE COC FOR A PUBLIC UTILITY?
12	A.	Yes. The COC, for both fixed-cost (debt and preferred stock) components and common
13		equity, are determined in part by current and prospective economic and financial
14	:	conditions. At any given time, each of the following factors has an influence on the
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16		COC:
		 The level of economic activity (i.e., growth rate of the economy);
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17 18		• The level of economic activity (i.e., growth rate of the economy);
		 The level of economic activity (i.e., growth rate of the economy); The stage of the business cycle (i.e., recession, expansion, or transition);

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My understanding is that this position is consistent with the *Bluefield* decision that noted

"[a] rate of return may be reasonable at one time and become too high or too low by

changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money market, and business

conditions generally." *Bluefield*, 262 U.S. at 693.

Q. WHAT INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITY DID YOU EVALUATE IN YOUR ANALYSES?

I examined several sets of economic statistics from 1975 to the present. I chose this time period because it permits the evaluation of economic conditions over four full business cycles, allowing for an assessment of changes in long-term trends. This period also approximates the beginning and continuation of active rate case activities by public utilities.

A business cycle is commonly defined as a complete period of expansion (recovery and growth) and contraction (recession). A full business cycle is a useful and convenient period over which to measure levels and trends in long-term capital costs because it incorporates the cyclical (i.e., stage of business cycle) influences, and thus, permits a comparison of structural (or long-term) trends.

17 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE TIMEFRAME OF THE FOUR PRIOR BUSINESS 18 CYCLES AND THE CURRENT CYCLE.

A. The four prior complete cycles and current cycle cover the following periods:

	Business Cycle	Expansion Cycle	Contraction Period
2	1975-1982	Mar. 1975-July 1981	Aug. 1981-Oct. 1982
<u> </u>	1982-1991	Nov. 1982-July 1990	Aug. 1990-Mar. 1991
3	1991-2001	Apr. 1991-Mar. 2001	Apr. 2001-Nov. 2001
	2001-2009	Dec. 2001-Nov. 2007	Dec. 2007-June 2009
	Current	July 2009-	
4	Source: National B	Jureau of Economic Research	"Rusiness Cyola Evnensio

Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, "Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions."

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DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE 6 Q. RECENT TRENDS IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON **CAPITAL COSTS OVER THIS BROAD PERIOD?**

Yes, I do. Until the end of 2007, the United States economy had enjoyed general 9 Α. prosperity and stability since the early 1980s. This period had been characterized by 10 longer economic expansions, relatively tame contractions, low and declining inflation, 11 12 and declining interest rates and other capital costs.

> However, in 2008 and 2009, the economy declined significantly, initially as a result of the 2007 collapse of the "sub-prime" mortgage market and the related liquidity crisis in the financial sector of the economy. Subsequently, this financial crisis intensified with a more broad-based decline, initially based on a substantial increase in petroleum prices and a dramatic decline in the U.S. financial sector, culminating with the collapse and/or bailouts of a significant number of well-known institutions such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, AIG and Wachovia.

There was a "Tech Bubble" in 1999-2000, in which prices of many technology stocks encountered a dramatic run-up that was followed by an equally dramatic decline in 2001-2002.

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The recession also witnessed the demise of national companies such as Circuit City and 1 the bankruptcies of automotive manufacturers such as Chrysler and General Motors. 2 This decline has been described as the worst financial crisis since the Great 3 Depression and has been referred to as the "Great Recession." Since 2008, the U.S. and 4 other governments have implemented and continue to implement unprecedented actions 5 to attempt to correct or minimize the scope and effects of this recession. 6 7 The recession reached its low point in mid-2009 and the economy has since begun 8 to expand again, although at a slow and uneven rate. However, the length and severity of 9 the recession, as well as a relatively slow and uneven recovery, indicates that the impacts of the recession have been and will be felt for an extended period of time. As an example 10 11 of this, even in the fifth year of the recovery/expansion, the U.S. unemployment rate still stands at nearly 8% -- close to the highest unemployment rate experienced over the last 12 13 several decades. 14 **Q**. PLEASE DESCRIBE RECENT AND CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 15 CONDITIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE COC. Exhibit DCP-2 shows several sets of relevant economic data for the cited time periods. 16 **A**. : Pages 1 and 2 contain general macroeconomic statistics; pages 3 and 4 show interest 17 rates; and pages 5 and 6 contain equity market statistics. Pages 1 and 2 show that 2007 was the sixth year of an economic expansion but, as 19

I previously noted, the economy subsequently entered a significant decline, as indicated

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by the growth in real (i.e., adjusted for inflation) Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"), industrial production, and an increase in the unemployment rate. This recession lasted until mid-2009, making it a longer-than-normal recession, as well as a deeper recession. Since then, economic growth has been erratic and lower than the initial periods of prior expansions.

Pages 1 and 2 also show the rate of inflation. As reflected in the Consumer Price Index ("CPI"), for example, inflation rose significantly during the 1975-1982 business cycle and reached double-digit levels in 1979-1980. The rate of inflation declined substantially beginning in 1981, and remained at or below 6.1% during the 1983-1991 business cycle. Since 2008, the CPI has been 3% or lower, with 2012 being only 1.7%. It is thus apparent that the rate of inflation has generally been declining over the past several business cycles. Current levels of inflation are at the lowest levels of the past 35 years. Low inflation is reflective of lower capital costs.

Q. WHAT HAVE BEEN THE TRENDS IN INTEREST RATES OVER THE FOUR PRIOR BUSINESS CYCLES AND AT THE CURRENT TIME?

Pages 3 and 4 show several series of interest rates. Rates reached record levels in 1975-1981 when the inflation rate was high and generally rising. They declined substantially (in conjunction with inflation rates) during the remainder of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Interest rates declined even further from 2000-2005 and generally recorded their then-lowest levels since the 1960s.

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Since 2008, the Federal Reserve has lowered the Federal Funds rate (i.e., short-term rate) to 0.25%, an all-time low. The Federal Reserve has also purchased U.S. Treasury securities to stimulate the economy. As seen on page 4, both U.S. and corporate bond yields declined to their lowest levels seen in the past four business cycles and in more than 35 years. Even with the recent increases, both government and corporate lending rates remain at historically low levels, again reflective of lower capital costs.

Q. WHAT DOES THIS EXHIBIT SHOW FOR TRENDS OF COMMON SHARE PRICES?

Pages 5 and 6 show several series of common stock prices and ratios. These indicate that stock prices were essentially stagnant during the high inflation/high interest rate environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 1983-1991 business cycle and the more recent cycles witnessed a significant upward trend in stock prices. The beginning of the recent financial crisis saw stock prices decline precipitously, as stock prices in 2008 and early 2009 were down significantly from 2007 levels, reflecting the financial/economic crisis. Beginning in the second quarter of 2009, prices have recovered substantially and have ultimately reached and exceeded the levels achieved prior to the "crash."

Q. WHAT CONCLUSIONS DO YOU DRAW FROM YOUR DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS?

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It is apparent that recent economic and financial circumstances have been different from any that have prevailed since at least the 1930s. The late 2008-early 2009 deterioration in stock prices, the decline in U.S. Treasury bond yields, and an increase in corporate bond yields were evidenced in the then-evident "flight to safety." On the other side of this "flight to safety" is the negative perception of the recent declines in capital costs and returns, which significantly reduced the value of most retirement accounts, investment portfolios and other assets. One significant aspect of this has been a decline in investor expectations of returns. Finally, as noted above, utility interest rates are currently at levels below those prevailing prior to the financial crisis of late 2008 to early 2009 and are near the lowest level in the past 35 years.

DP&L'S OPERATIONS AND BUSINESS RISKS

- 12 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE DP&L AND ITS OPERATIONS.
- 13 A. DP&L is a utility that provides electric transmission, distribution, and default supply to
 14 Delaware and portions of Maryland. It also supplies natural gas service in Northern
 15 Delaware. DP&L is ultimately a wholly-owned subsidiary of PHI.

Two mergers over the past several years have resulted in changes in DP&L's organizational structure. In 1998, DP&L combined with Atlantic Energy, Inc. (parent company of Atlantic City Electric Company – ACE) to form Conectiv, a holding company for DP&L and ACE. In 2002, Conectiv was acquired by PHI (formerly

1.		rotolliac Electric Power Co.). Conectiv is now a subsidiary of PHI and DP&L and ACE
2		are subsidiaries of Conectiv.
3	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE PHI.
4	A.	PHI was created in connection with the 2002 merger of Potomac Electric Power Co. and
5		Conectiv. This is a holding company whose primary subsidiaries are:
6 7 8		 Potomac Electric Power Company ("Pepco") – a regulated utility that delivers electricity in Washington, D.C. and its Maryland suburbs;
9 10 11		 Conectiv, LLC – an entity that owns DP&L and ACE, which provide electric and gas delivery in Delaware, Maryland and New Jersey;
12 13 14		 Pepco Energy Services, Inc. – a provider of energy efficiency and renewable energy services; and,
15 16 17		• Potomac Capital Investment Corporation – invests in energy-related financial investments.
18		Within this framework, DP&L, ACE and Pepco remain as separate operating public
19		utilities.
20	Q.	WHAT ARE THE CURRENT BOND RATINGS OF DP&L?
21	A.	The present bond ratings (senior secured debt) of DP&L are as follows:
22		Moody's A3
23		Standard & Poor's A
24	Q.	WHAT HAVE BEEN THE TRENDS IN DP&L'S AND PHI'S BOND RATINGS?

- A. This is shown on Exhibit DCP-3, which indicates two points. First, DP&L has experienced upgrades in its ratings since 2007. Second, the ratings of DP&L are similar to those of Pepco and ACE, but higher than those of PHI.
- 4 Q. HOW DO DP&L'S CURRENT BOND RATINGS COMPARE TO THOSE OF
 5 OTHER ELECTRIC AND COMBINATION GAS/ELECTRIC UTILITIES?
- As I indicated in the previous answer, DP&L has single-A bond ratings on its senior long-term debt. Below is a table depicting the bond rating data of the 51 electric utilities and combination gas/electric utilities covered by AUS Utility Reports:. As can be seen, Delmarva's "A" rating is better than most of the utilities, and its A3 rating is exceeded by only 13 of the 51 companies.

11	Moody's	Number of	S&P	Number of
12	Rating	Companies	Rating	Companies
12	Aa3	1	AA-	1
13	A1	3	A+	· ·
15	A2	10	\mathbf{A}	6*
14	A3	13*	A-	16
1 (Baa1	11	BBB+	10
15	Baa2	11	BBB	13
	Baa3		BBB-	4
16	Ba or less		BB	
10	NR	2	NR	3
	4 DDAT	***		

* DP&L ratings.

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1 <u>CAPITAL STRUCTURE</u>

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2 Q. WHAT IS THE IMPORTANCE OF DETERMINING A PROPER CAPITAL

STRUCTURE IN A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK?

A utility's capital structure is important because the concept of rate base – rate of return regulation requires that a utility's capital structure be determined and utilized in estimating the total cost of capital. Within this framework, it is proper to ascertain whether the utility's capital structure is appropriate relative to its level of business risk and relative to other utilities.

As discussed in Section III of my testimony, the purpose of determining the proper capital structure for a utility is to help ascertain its capital costs. The rate base-rate of return concept recognizes the assets employed in providing utility services and provides for a return on these assets by identifying the liabilities and common equity (and their cost rates) used to finance the assets. In this process, the rate base is derived from the asset side of the balance sheet and the cost of capital is derived from the liabilities/owners' equity side of the balance sheet. The inherent assumption in this procedure is that the dollar values of the capital structure and the rate base are approximately equal and the former is utilized to finance the latter.

The common equity ratio (*i.e.*, the percentage of common equity in the capital structure) is the capital structure item which normally receives the most attention. This is the case because common equity: (1) usually commands the highest cost rate; (2)

- generates associated income tax liabilities; and, (3) causes the most controversy since its
- 2 cost cannot be precisely determined.

3 Q. HOW HAVE YOU EVALUATED DP&L's CAPITAL STRUCTURE?

- 4 A. I have first examined DP&L's five year historic (2008-2012) capital structure ratios.
- 5 These are shown on Page 1 of Exhibit DCP-4. I have summarized below the common
- 6 equity ratios for DP&L:

7		Including S-T Debt	Excluding S-T Debt
	2008	44.8%	49.2%
8	2009	50.7%	50.7%
	2010	49.3%	49.3%
9	2011	48.3%	49.6%
	2012	48.4%	49.2%

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Page 2 of Exhibit DCP-4 shows PHI's historic capital structure ratios on a consolidated basis. This indicates the following common equity ratios.

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		Including S-T Debt	Excluding S-T Debt
14	2008	43.8%	45.3%
•	2009	43.2%	45.0%
15	2010	50.2%	52.7%
	2011	48.6%	52.0%
16	2012	46.3%	50.7%

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These common equity ratios are similar to those of DP&L.

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Page 3 of Exhibit DCP-4 shows the 2012 capital structure ratios of PHI's utility subsidiaries. DP&L's common equity ratios are seen to be somewhat higher than the common equity range of the other utility companies.

1 Q. HOW DO THESE CAPITAL STRUCTURES COMPARE TO THOSE OF

2 INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES?

- A. Exhibit DCP-5 shows the common equity ratios (including short-term debt in capitalization) for the two groups of electric utilities covered by AUS Utility Reports.
- 5 These are:

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6			Combination Gas
6	Year	Electric	and Electric
7	2008	45%	43%
/	2009	46%	45%
0	2010	46%	46%
8	2011	47%	46%
0	2012	47%	46%

These common equity ratios are slightly lower than those of DP&L and PHI.

SELECTION OF PROXY GROUPS

12 Q. HOW HAVE YOU ESTIMATED THE COE FOR DP&L?

- 13 A. DP&L is not a publicly-traded company. PHI, DP&L's parent company, is a publicly-
- traded company. Consequently, it is possible to directly apply COE models to this entity.
- However, it is generally preferred to analyze groups of comparison or "proxy" companies
- as a substitute for DP&L to determine its cost of common equity.
- I have examined two such groups for comparison of DP&L. I selected one group of electric utilities similar to DP&L and PHI using the criteria listed on Exhibit DCP-6:
- 19 (1) Market capitalization of \$1 billion to 10 billion;
- 20 (2) Electric revenues 50% or greater;

1		(3) Common equity ratio 40% or greater;
2		(4) Value Line safety rank of 1, 2 or 3;
3		(5) Standard & Poor's ("S&P") stock ranking of A or B;
4		(6) S&P or Moody's bond ratings of A;
5		(7) Currently pays dividends; and
6		(8) Is not currently involved in a major merger.
7		Second, I have conducted studies of the COE for the group of "comparison companies"
8	select	ed by DP&L witness Mr. Hevert.
9	DISC	COUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS
0	Q.	WHAT IS THE THEORY AND METHODOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE
1		DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL?
2	A.	The discounted cash flow (DCF) model is one of the oldest, as well as the most
3		commonly-used, models for estimating the COE for public utilities. The DCF model is
.4	ţ.	based on the "dividend discount model" of financial theory, which maintains that the
5		value (price) of any security or commodity is the discounted present value of all future
6		cash flows.
7		The most common variant of the DCF model assumes that dividends are expected
8	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	to grow at a constant rate. This variant of the dividend discount model is known as the
9		constant growth or Gordon DCF model. In this framework cost of capital is derived by
20		the following formula:

 $K = \frac{D}{P} + g$ 1 2 where: K = discount rate (cost of capital)3 P = current price 4 D = current dividend rate 5 6 g = constant rate of expected growth This formula essentially recognizes that the return expected or required by investors is 7 comprised of two factors: the dividend yield (current income) and expected growth in 8 dividends (future income). 9 10 PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU HAVE EMPLOYED THE DCF MODEL. Q. 11 A. I have utilized the constant growth DCF model. In doing so, I have combined the current dividend yield for the groups of proxy utility stocks described in the previous section 12 13 with several indicators of expected dividend growth. HOW DID YOU DERIVE THE DIVIDEND YIELD COMPONENT OF THE DCF 14 Q. **EQUATION?** 15 There are several methods that can be used for calculating the dividend yield component. 16 A. 17 These methods generally differ in the manner in which the dividend rate is employed; 18 i.e., current versus future dividends, or annual versus quarterly compounding of 19 dividends. I believe the most appropriate dividend yield component is the version listed 20 below:

 $Yield = \frac{D_0(1+0.5g)}{P_0}$

A.

This dividend yield component recognizes that dividend payments and dividend increases occur at different times throughout the year.

The P₀ in my yield calculation is the average (of high and low) stock price for each proxy company for the most recent three month period (May-July, 2013). The D₀ is the current annualized dividend rate for each proxy company.

Q. HOW HAVE YOU ESTIMATED THE DIVIDEND GROWTH COMPONENT OF THE DCF EQUATION?

The dividend growth rate component of the DCF model is usually the most crucial and controversial element involved in using this methodology. The objective of estimating the dividend growth component is to reflect the growth expected by investors that is embodied in the price (and yield) of a company's stock. As such, it is important to recognize that individual investors have different expectations and consider alternative indicators in deriving their expectations. This is evidenced by the fact that every investment decision resulting in the purchase of a particular stock is matched by another investment decision to sell that stock. Obviously, since two investors reach different decisions at the same market price, their expectations differ.

A wide array of indicators exists for estimating the growth expectations of investors. As a result, it is evident that no single indicator of growth is always used by all

1		investors, and so I believe it is necessary to consider alternative indicators of dividend				
2		growth in deriving the growth component of the DCF model.				
3		I have considered five indicators of growth in my DCF analyses. These are:				
4 5		1. 2008-2012 (5-year average) earnings retention, or fundamental growth (per Value Line);				
6 7 8		2. 5-year average of historic growth in earnings per share ("EPS"), dividends per share ("DPS"), and book value per share ("BVPS") (per Value Line);				
9 10 11		3. 2013, 2014 and 2016-2018 projections of earnings retention growth (per Value Line);				
12 13 14		4. 2010-2012 to 2016-2018 projections of EPS, DPS, and BVPS (per Value Line); and,				
15 16		5. 5-year projections of EPS growth (per First Call).				
17 18		I believe this combination of growth indicators is a representative and appropriate set				
19		with which to begin the process of estimating investor expectations of dividend growth				
20		for the groups of proxy companies. As I indicated previously, investors have an array of				
21		information available to them, all of which should be expected to have some impact on				
22		their decision-making process.				
23	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR DCF CALCULATIONS.				
24	A.	Exhibit DCP-7 presents my DCF analysis. Page 1 shows the calculation of the "raw"				
25	·	(i.e., prior to adjustment for growth) dividend yield for each proxy company. Pages 2				
26	÷	and 3 show the various growth rates for the groups of proxy companies. Page 4 shows				

the "raw" DCF calculations, which are presented on several bases: mean, median, and low/high values. These results can be summarized as follows:

			Mean	Mean	Median	Median
	Mean	Median	Low^2	High ³	Low^2	High ²
Proxy Group	8.1%	7.9%	7.0%	9.4%	6.7%	9.0%
Hevert Group	8.2%	8.0%	6.8%	9.0%	6.4%	9.1%

I note that the individual DCF calculations shown on Exhibit DCP-7 should not be interpreted to reflect the expected cost of capital for the proxy groups; rather, the individual values shown should be interpreted as alternative information considered by investors. The individual DCF calculations also demonstrate how the focus on a single growth rate, such as EPS projections, can produce a DCF conclusion that is not reflective of a broader perspective of available information.

The results in Exhibit DCP-7 indicate average (mean and median) DCF cost rates of 7.9% to 8.2%. The "high" DCF rates (i.e., using the highest growth rates only) are between 9.0% and 9.4% on an average basis and median basis.

Q. WHAT DO YOU CONCLUDE FROM YOUR DCF ANALYSES?

16 A. This analysis reflects a broad DCF range of about 6.8% to about 9.4% for the proxy groups. This is approximated by the average/mean value and high values for the proxy groups examined in the previous analysis. I give less weight to the low values and

Using only the lowest growth rate.
Using only the highest growth rate.

- average values of the groups. I believe that 9.0% to 9.4% (9.20% mid-point) reflects the proper DCF-calculated COE for DP&L.

 CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL ANALYSIS
- 4 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE THEORY AND METHODOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE CAPM.
- A. The CAPM is a version of the risk premium method that describes and measures the relationship between a security's investment risk and its market rate of return. The CAPM was developed in the 1960s and 1970s as an extension of modern portfolio theory, which studies the relationships among risk, diversification, and expected returns.
- 10 Q. HOW IS THE CAPM DERIVED?
- 11 A. The general form of the CAPM is:
- $K = R_f + \beta (R_m R_f)$
- where: K = cost of equity
- $R_f = risk$ free rate
- $R_m = \text{return on market}$
- $\beta = beta$
- $R_{m}-R_{f} = \text{market risk premium}$
- As noted previously, the CAPM is a variant of the risk premium method. I believe the CAPM is generally superior to the simple risk premium method because the CAPM specifically recognizes the risk of a particular company or industry (*i.e.*, beta), whereas

:	1		the simple risk premium method assumes the same risk premium for all companies
	2		exhibiting similar bond ratings.
ē	3	Q.	WHAT GROUP OF COMPANIES HAVE YOU UTILIZED TO PERFORM YOUR
	4		CAPM ANALYSES?
	5	A.	I have performed CAPM analyses for the same groups of proxy utilities evaluated in my
	6		DCF analyses.
	7	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE RISK-FREE RATE AS USED IN YOUR CAPM AND
- -	8		INDICATE WHAT RATE YOU EMPLOYED.
	9	A.	The first term of the CAPM is the risk-free rate (R _f). The risk-free rate reflects the level
-	10		of return that can be achieved without accepting any risk.
	11		In CAPM applications, the risk-free rate is generally recognized by use of U.S.
-	12		Treasury securities. Two general types of U.S. Treasury securities are often utilized as
:	13		the $R_{\rm f}$ component - short-term U.S. Treasury bills and long-term U.S. Treasury bonds.
	14	÷	I have performed CAPM calculations using the most recent three-month average
5	15		yield (May-July 2013) for 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds. Over this three-month period,
:	16		these bonds had an average yield of 3.04%.
: :	17	Q.	WHAT IS BETA AND WHAT BETAS DID YOU EMPLOY IN YOUR CAPM?
	18	Α.	Beta is a measure of the relative volatility (and thus risk) of a particular stock in relation
	19		to the overall market. Betas of less than 1.0 are considered less risky than the market,
	20	•	whereas betas greater than 1.0 are more risky. Utility stocks traditionally have had betas

below 1.0. I utilized the most recent Value Line betas for each company in the groups of proxy utilities.

Q. HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE THE MARKET RISK PREMIUM COMPONENT IN

YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS?

Α.

The market risk premium component (R_m-R_f) represents the investor-expected premium of common stocks over the risk-free rate, or government bonds. For the purpose of estimating the market risk premium, I considered alternative measures of returns of the S&P 500 (a broad-based group of large U.S. companies) and 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds.

First, I have compared the actual annual returns on equity of the S&P 500 with the actual annual yields of U.S. Treasury bonds. Exhibit DCP-8 shows the return on equity for the S&P 500 group for the period 1978-2012 (all available years reported by S&P). This schedule also indicates the annual yields on 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds, as well as the annual differentials (*i.e.*, risk premiums) between the S&P 500 and U.S. Treasury 20-year bonds. Based upon these returns, I conclude that this version of the risk premium is about 6.6%.

I have also considered the total returns (i.e., dividends/interest plus capital gains/losses) for the S&P 500 group as well as for the long-term government bonds, as tabulated by Morningstar (formerly Ibbotson Associates), using both arithmetic and

- geometric means. I have considered the total returns for the entire available period (1926-2012), which are as follows:
- S&P 500
 L-T Gov't Bonds
 Risk Premium

 4
 Arithmetic
 11.8%
 6.1%
 5.7%

 Geometric
 9.8%
 5.7%
 4.1%
- I conclude from this that the expected risk premium is about 5.47% (i.e., average of all three risk premiums). I believe that a combination of arithmetic and geometric means is appropriate since investors have access to both types of means and, presumably, both types are reflected in investment decisions and thus stock prices and cost of capital.

9 Q. WHAT ARE YOUR CAPM RESULTS?

10 A. Exhibit DCP-9 shows my CAPM calculations. The results are:

11	•	Mean	Median
12	Proxy Group	7.0%	6.9%
12	Hevert Group	7.0%	6.9%

14 Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE CAPM COE?

15 A. The result of my CAPM analyses collectively indicates a COE of 6.9% to 7.0% for the groups of proxy utilities. I conclude that the CAPM COE for DP&L is 6.9% to 7.0%.

COMPARABLE EARNINGS ANALYSIS

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- 18 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE BASIS OF THE CE METHODOLOGY.
- 19 A. The CE method is derived from the "corresponding risk" concept discussed in the 20 Bluefield and Hope cases, and thus is based upon the economic concept of opportunity

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cost. As previously noted, the cost of capital is an opportunity cost: the prospective return available to investors from alternative investments of similar risk.

The CE method is designed to measure the returns expected to be earned on the original cost book value of similar risk enterprises. Thus, it provides a direct measure of the fair return, since it translates into practice the competitive principle upon which regulation rests.

The CE method normally examines the experienced and/or projected returns on book common equity ("ROE"). The logic for examining ROE follows from the use of original cost rate base regulation for public utilities, which uses a utility's book common equity to determine the COC. This COC is, in turn, used as the fair rate of return which is then applied to (multiplied by) the book value of rate base to establish the dollar level of capital costs to be recovered by the utility. This technique is thus consistent with the rate base-rate of return methodology used to set utility rates.

14 Q. HOW DO YOU APPLY THE CE METHODOLOGY IN YOUR ANALYSIS OF DP&L'S COE?

I apply the CE methodology by examining realized ROEs for the two groups of proxy companies and unregulated companies, and evaluating investor acceptance of these returns by reference to the resulting market-to-book ratios ("M/B"). In this manner it is possible to assess the degree to which a given level of return equates to the COC. It is generally recognized for utilities that M/Bs of greater than one (*i.e.* 100%) reflect a

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situation where a company is able to attract new equity capital without dilution (*i.e.* above book value). As a result, one objective of a fair COE is the maintenance of stock prices at or above book value. There is no regulatory obligation to set rates designed to maintain a M/B significantly above one.

I further note that my CE analysis is based upon market data (through the use of M/B) and is thus essentially a market test. As a result, my CE analysis is not subject to the criticisms occasionally made by some who maintain that past earned returns do not represent the cost of capital. In addition, my CE analysis also uses prospective returns and thus is not backward looking.

Q. WHAT TIME PERIODS DO YOU EXAMINE IN YOUR CE ANALYSIS?

My CE analysis considers the experienced ROEs of the proxy groups of utilities for the period 1992-2012 (*i.e.* the last twenty-one years). The CE analysis requires that I examine a relatively long period of time in order to determine trends in earnings over at least a full business cycle. Further, in estimating a fair level of return for a future period, it is important to examine earnings over a diverse period of time in order to avoid any undue influence from unusual or abnormal conditions that may occur in a single year or shorter period. Therefore, in forming my judgment of the current COE, I focused on three periods: 2009-2012 (the current cycles), 2002-2008 (the most recent business cycle) and 1992-2001 (the previous business cycle).

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR CE ANALYSIS.

- Exhibits DCP-10 and DCP-11 contain summaries of experienced ROEs for three groups 1 A. of companies, while Exhibit DCP-12 presents a risk comparison of utilities versus 2 unregulated firms. 3
- 4 Exhibit DCP-10 shows the ROEs and M/Bs for the groups of proxy utilities. These can be summarized as follows: 5

6 7		Proxy Group	Hevert Group
1	Historic ROE		<u></u>
8	Mean	9.1-11.8%	8.4-11.5%
0	Median	9.2-12.0%	8.3-11.8%
9	Historic M/B		
	Mean	128-170%	122-155%
10	Median	120-161%	118-162%
10	Prospective ROE		
11	Mean	9.3-10.0%	9.2-9.8%
	Median	8.8-9.5%	9.0-9.8%

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These results indicate that ROEs of 8.3% to 12.0% have been adequate to produce M/Bs of 120% to 170% for the groups of utilities. Furthermore, projected ROEs for 2013, 2014 and 2016-2018 range from 8.8% to 10.0% for the utility groups. These relate to 2012 M/Bs of 134% or greater.

DID YOU ALSO REVIEW THE EARNINGS OF UNREGULATED FIRMS? Q.

Yes. As an alternative, I also examined the S&P 500 Composite group. This is a well-19 recognized group of firms that is widely utilized in the investment community and is 20 indicative of the competitive sector of the economy. Exhibit DCP-11 presents the earned

- returns on equity and market-to-book ratios for the S&P 500 group over the past twentyone years (i.e., 1992-2012). As this schedule indicates, over the three business cycle
 periods, this group's average ROE ranged from 12.4% to 14.7%,, with average M/Bs
 ranging between 204% and 341%.
- Q. HOW CAN THE ABOVE INFORMATION BE USED TO ESTIMATE DP&L'sCOE?
- The recent earnings of the proxy utilities and S&P 500 groups can be viewed as an 7 Α. indication of the level of return realized and expected in the regulated and competitive 8 sectors of the economy. In order to apply these returns to the COE for the proxy utilities, 9 10 however, it is necessary to compare the risk levels of the electric utilities and the 11 competitive companies. I do this in Exhibit DCP-12, which compares several risk indicators for the S&P 500 group and the electric utility groups. The information in 12 13 Exhibit DCP-12 indicates that the S&P 500 group is more risky than the electric proxy 14 groups.

15 Q. WHAT COE IS INDICATED BY YOUR CE ANALYSIS?

16 A. Based on ROEs and M/Bs, my CE analysis indicates that the COE for the proxy utilities 17 is no more than 9.0% to 10.0%. Recent ROEs of 8.3% to 12.0% have resulted in M/Bs 18 more than 120%. Prospective ROEs of 8.8% to 10.0% have been accompanied by M/Bs 19 over 130%. As a result, it is apparent that authorized returns below this level would 20 continue to result in M/B of well above 100%. An earned return of 9.0% to 10.0%

should thus result in a M/B well above 100%. As I indicated earlier, the fact that M/B ratios substantially exceed 100% indicates that historic and prospective ROEs of over 10.0% reflect earnings levels that are well above the actual COE for those regulated companies. I also note that a company whose stock sells above book value can attract capital in a way that enhances the book value of existing stockholders, thus creating a favorable environment for financial integrity.

COE RECOMMENDATION

8 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF YOUR THREE COE ANALYSES.

9 A. My three analyses produce the following results:

10	DCF	9.0-9.4%	(9.20% mid-point)
11	CAPM	6.9-7.0%	(6.95% mid-point)
12	CE	9.0-10.0%	(9.50% mid-point)

These results indicate an overall broad range of 6.9% to 10.0%, which focuses on the respective ranges of my individual model results. Focusing on the respective midpoints, the range is 6.95% to 9.5%. I recommend a COE range of 9.2% to 9.5% for DP&L. Though this recommendation is higher than my CAPM findings, it includes the mid-point of my DCF range (9.2%) and the mid-point of my CE range (9.5%). For the purposes of this proceeding, I recommend the mid-point of this range, which is 9.35%. I note that my 9.35% recommendation exceeds the mid-point of my DCF analyses, which in turn, essentially incorporates only the highest of the growth rates.

- 1 Q. YOUR CAPM RESULTS ARE LESS THAN YOUR DCF AND CE RESULTS.
- 2 DOES THIS IMPLY THAT THE CAPM RESULTS SHOULD NOT BE
- 3 CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE COE FOR DP&L?
 - No. It is apparent that the CAPM results are less than the DCF and CE results. There are two reasons for the lower CAPM results. First, risk premiums are lower currently than was the case in prior years. This is also reflective of a decline in investor expectations of equity returns and risk premiums. Second, the level of interest rates on U.S. Treasury bonds (i.e., the risk-free rate) has been lower in recent years. This is partially the result of the actions of the Federal Reserve System to stimulate the economy. This also impacts investor expectations of return in a negative fashion. I note that, initially, investors may have believed that the decline in Treasury yields was a temporary factor that would soon be replaced by a rise in interest rates. However, this has not been the case as interest rates have remained low and, even with recent increases, continue to be at historically low levels. As a result, it cannot be maintained that low interest rates (and low CAPM results) are temporary and do not reflect investor expectations. Consequently, the CAPM results should be considered as one factor in determining the cost of equity for DP&L. At the very least, the CAPM results indicate the capital costs continue at historically low levels and that DP&L's COE is less than in prior years.

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1 TOTAL COST OF CAPITAL

2	Q.	WHAT	IS THE	TOTAL	COC F	OR DP&L?
---	----	------	--------	--------------	-------	----------

- 3 A. Exhibit DCP-1 reflects the COC for the Company using DP&L's proposed capital
- 4 structure along with the cost of debt and range of common equity costs my analyses
- support. The resulting COC is a range of 7.02% to 7.17% (7.09% with my recommended
- 9.35% COE). I recommend that this 7.09% COC be established for DP&L.
- 7 Q. DOES YOUR COC RECOMMENDATION PROVIDE THE COMPANY WITH A
- 8 SUFFICIENT LEVEL OF EARNINGS TO MAINTAIN ITS FINANCIAL
- 9 **INTEGRITY?**
- 10 A. Yes, it does. Exhibit DCP-13 shows the pre-tax coverage that would result if DP&L
- earned my COC recommendation. As the results indicate, my recommended range would
- result in a coverage level within the benchmark range for an A-rated utility. In addition,
- the debt ratio (which reflects the Company's proposed capital structure) is within the
- benchmark for an A-rated utility.

15 <u>COMMENTS ON COMPANY TESTIMONY</u>

- 16 Q. WHAT COE IS DP&L REQUESTING IN THIS PROCEEDING?
- 17 A. DP&L is requesting a COE of 10.25%. This request is contained in the testimony of
- DP&L witness Mr. Hevert.
- 19 Q. HAVE YOU REVIEWED THE TESTIMONY OF DP&L WITNESS ROBERT B.
- 20 **HEVERT?**

- 1 A. Yes, I have. Mr. Hevert indicates (page 2, lines 18-22) that in his view that a 10.5% COE
- is "reasonable and appropriate" for DP&L and, thus, the Company's 10.25% requested
- COE is "reasonable, if not conservative." His recommendation is derived as follows:

	Mean Low	Mean	Mean High
DCF Results			
		Mean Results	
30-Day Average	9.00%	10.21%	11.63%
90-Day Average	9.09%	10.30%	11.71%
180-Day Average	9.08%	10.29%	11.71%
		Median Results	
30-Day Average	9.65%	10.47%	11.39%
90-Day Average	9.80%	10.62%	11.44%
180-Day Average	9.88%	10.70%	11.39%
			Near-Term
		Current	Projected
		30-Year	30- Year
		Treasury	Year Treasury
CAPM Results		(3.12%)	(3.25%)
·			
	Value Line Beta C	oefficient	
Sharpe Ratio Derived Mark	et Risk Premium	7.44%	7.57%
Bloomberg Derived Market	Risk Premium	10.20%	10.33%
Capital IQ Derived Market	Risk Premium	10.15%	10.28%
	Bloomberg Beta C	oefficient	
Sharpe Ratio Derived Mark	\sim	7.43%	7.57%
Bloomberg Derived Market		10.19%	10.32%
Capital IQ Derived Market		10.14%	10.27%
Bond Yield Plus Risk Prem	ium		
Dong Tield Tius Kisk Fielli	<u>rum</u>	Near-Term	Long-Term
	Current	Projected	Projected
	(3.12%)	(3.25%)	(5.10%)
Risk Premium	10.23%	10.24%	10.76%
MSK I ICHHUIH	10.23/0	10,47/0	10.70/0

1 Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT MR. HEVERT'S

2 TESTIMONY AND CONCLUSIONS?

- A. Yes, I do. Mr. Hevert's testimony significantly overstates DP&L's COC. Each of his methods, and virtually all of his inputs into those methods, is systematically biased upward in a manner that significantly inflates his COE conclusions.
- Q. WHAT ARE YOUR DISAGREEMENTS WITH MR. HEVERT'S CONSTANT
 GROWTH DCF ANALYSES?
 - A. Mr. Hevert's constant growth DCF analyses are based on 30-day, 90-day and 180-day average stock prices for the periods ending February 15, 2013, annualized dividends per share as of February 15, 2013 and the average of Value Line, First Call and Zack's EPS projections. His DCF analyses are applied to his group of twelve electric utilities.

Mr. Hevert's constant growth DCF analyses are shown on his Exhibit RBH-1. It is apparent from review of his Exhibit that his "Low DCF ROE" for each proxy company reflects the dividend yield and the lowest of the three EPS growth rates he considers. His "Mean DCF ROE" considers the average of all three EPS growth rates and his "High DCF ROE" only considers the highest EPS growth rate for each company. Stated differently, the "High DCF" result considers only the highest of the three EPS growth rates for each company and ignores the other two EPS growth rates. Thus, the "Mean High DCF" result for one proxy company may reflect only the Zacks EPS Growth, while the "Mean High DCF" result for another proxy company may reflect only the Value Line

1	÷	growth result. Mr. Hevert's DCF result implicitly assumes that investors only consider
2		the most optimistic EPS growth rate for each individual company in making investment
3		decisions.
4	Q.	IS IT APPROPRIATE TO FOCUS ON THE HIGHEST GROWTH RATE, ON A
5		COMPANY-TO-COMPANY BASIS, TO DETERMINE THE COE FOR AN
6		ELECTRIC UTILITY SUCH AS DP&L?
7	Α.	No. It is neither realistic nor appropriate to focus on a single EPS growth rate in a DCF
8		context, especially when one "cherry picks" the highest EPS growth rate for each
9		company from among the different EPS growth rate indicators that reflect the highest
10		EPS growth rate for each company. As I indicated above, Mr. Hevert's analyses focus
11		only on methods and data that produce the highest possible results.
12	Q.	ARE THERE ANY OTHER PROBLEMS WITH MR. HEVERT'S CONSTANT
13		GROWTH DCF ANALYSES?
14	A.	Yes. Even though Mr. Hevert purports to examine three alternative growth rates in his
15		constant growth DCF analyses, in reality each of the three focuses on a single statistic:
16	· .	analysts' EPS forecasts.
17	Q.	YOU HAVE INDICATED YOUR DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE MANNER IN
18		WHICH MR. HEVERT CONDUCTS HIS DCF ANALYSES. DO YOU HAVE
19		ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS CONCERNING HIS DCF ANALYSES AND
20		CONCLUSIONS?

- 1 A. Yes, I do. Aside from the points I previously noted that his analyses focus just on 2 analysts' projections of EPS it is also apparent that his analyses do not reflect the 3 current DCF COE for an electric utility such as DP&L.
- 4 Q. NOTWITHSTANDING YOUR DISAGREEMENTS WITH MR. HEVERT'S DCF
- 5 ANALYSES, HAVE YOU PREPARED AN UPDATE OF THE METHODOLOGY
- 6 AND DATA SOURCES HE USED IN HIS DCF ANALYSES?
- 7 A. Yes, I have prepared Exhibit DCP-14 to provide a current version of Mr. Hevert's DCF
 8 analyses using the same three sources of EPS projections for the proxy companies he
 9 used in his Direct Testimony. I have also updated the dividend yield calculation to reflect
 10 three-month stock prices through the end of July 2013.
- 11 Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR UPDATES OF MR. HEVERT'S DCF
 12 ANALYSES?
 - A. The following DCF cost rates are apparent for his group of proxy companies:

14		DCF Results		
15	Growth Rate	Average	Median	
16	Zacks	9.20%	9.19%	
17	First Call	8.98%	9.29%	
18	Value Line	9.59%	9.08%	

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These DCF cost rates are generally consistent with the 9.0% to 9.4% DCF results in my testimony.

DELMARVA POWER & LIGHT, CO. **DOCKET NO. 13-115**

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DAVID C. PARCELL Q. HAVE YOU ALSO PERFORMED UPDATED DCF ANALYSES USING ONLY 1 THE HIGHEST GROWTH RATES, AS MR. HEVERT DOES IN HIS 2 3 **TESTIMONY?** Yes, I have, even though I do not believe that this is appropriate, since it uses different 4 Α. growth rates for each proxy company, and assumes that investors rely only on the most 5 optimistic projections. Exhibit DCP-14 indicates the updated DCF results, where each 6 company's EPS forecast is the highest of the three possible forecasts. This results in the 7 following results for Mr. Hevert's proxy group: 8 9 Average DCF 11.35% 10 Median DCF 9.84% 11 Q. WHY IS THE AVERAGE DCF RESULT SO MUCH HIGHER THAN THE 12 **MEDIAN DCF RESULT?** Α.

13 The average DCF result is higher because two of the proxy companies' highest projected 14 growth rates reflect Value Line EPS projections as follows:

15	Company	EPS Growth	DCF	
16	Otter Tail Company	21.50%	26.01%	
17	PNM Resources	12.00%	15.09%	
18	It is apparent that these estimate	d EPS growth rate	s are outliers an	d are

For example, the highest Value Line EPS growth rate for the other proxy companies is 19 20 6.5%, which is only about one-half as large as PNM Resources and about one-third as

1		large as Otter Tail Corp. As further indication of the unsustainability of these growth
2		rates, one need only examine the most recent historic 5-year growth rate in EPS for these
3		two companies:
4		Company EPS Growth
5		Otter Tail Company -18.5%
6		PNM Resources -4.0%
7	Q.	HAVE YOU REFLECTED THE AVERAGE UPDATED AVERAGE FOR MR.
8		HEVERT'S PROXY GROUP EXCLUDING THESE TWO COMPANIES?
9	A.	Yes, I have. As is shown on Exhibit DCP-14:
10		Average DCF 9.51%
11		Median DCF 9.45%
12	Q.	DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. HEVERT'S RISK PREMIUM COMPONENT OF
13		THE CAPM?
14	A.	No. Mr. Hevert's CAPM analyses utilize three risk premium values: ⁴
15		Sharpe Ratio MRP 6.03%
16		Ex Ante Bloomberg MRP 9.88%
17		Ex Ante Capital 1Q MRP 9.81%
18		Each of these greatly exceeds the long-term experience (e.g., 1929 to present) of
19		investment return differential between common stocks and government bonds, as I
20		describe earlier in my testimony. Over this period, risk premiums have averaged less

- than 6%. Mr. Hevert offered no evidence or rationale to explain why investors would expect such a large increase in risk premiums over historic levels. This is simply another example of how Mr. Hevert chooses data that produces higher and excessive results.
- 4 Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY RESPONSES TO MR. HEVERT'S RISK PREMIUM
- 5 ANALYSES?
- Yes. Mr. Hevert's risk premium approach compares the allowed ROEs for electric 6 utilities and 30-Year U.S. Government Bond yields over the period 1980 to February 7 8 2013. He then performs a regression analysis to develop an expected relationship between 30-year U.S. Government Bond yields and the COE for electric utilities. He 9 10 applies this regression result to three levels of 30-year U.S. Treasury Bonds and correspondingly arrives at his 10.23% to 10.76% conclusion. I note that the average 11 12 authorized ROE for electric utilities has not been as high as 10.23% since 2010 and has not been as high as 10.76% since 2003.⁵ This indicates that Mr. Hevert's risk premium 13 14 results, which are claimed to be based on regulatory decisions, are excessive relative to these decisions. 15
- 16 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?
- 17 A. Yes, it does.

Exhibit RBH-2.

See response to AG-COC-13.

DELMARVA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY TOTAL COST OF CAPITAL AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2012

Item	Percent 1/ Cost		Weighted Cost				
Long-Term Debt	50.78%	<u> </u>	4.91%	1/		2.49%	
Common Equity	49.22%	9.20%	9.35%	9.50%	4.53%	4.60%	4.68%
Total	100.00%			•	7.02%	7.09% Mid-Point	7.17% t

^{1/} Capital structure ratios and cost of long-term debt contained in Company filing (Schedule No. 4).

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Year	Real GDP* Growth	Industrial Production Growth	Unemploy- ment Rate	Consumer Price Index	Produce Price Inde
		1975 - 19	982 Cycle		
1975	-1.1%	-8.9%	8.5%	7.0%	6.6%
1976	5.4%	10.8%	7.7%	4.8%	3.7%
1977	5.5%	5.9%	7.0%	6.8%	6.9%
1978	5.0%	5.7%	6.0%	9.0%	9.2%
1979	2.8%	4.4%	5.8%	13.3%	12.8%
1980	-0.2%	-1.9%	7.0%	12.4%	
1981	1.8%	1.9%	7.0% 7.5%	8.9%	11.8%
1982	-2.1%	-4.4%			7.1%
1902	-2.170	-4 .470	9.5%	3.8%	3.6%
			991 Cycle		
1983	4.0%	3.7%	9.5%	3.8%	0.6%
1984	6.8%	9.3%	7.5%	3.9%	1.7%
1985	3.7%	1.7%	7.2%	3.8%	1.8%
1986	3.1%	0.9%	7.0%	1.1%	-2.3%
1987	2.9%	4.9%	6.2%	4.4%	2.2%
1988	3.8%	4.5%	5.5%	4.4%	4.0%
1989	3.5%	1.8%	5.3%	4.6%	4.9%
1990	1.8%	-0.2%	5.6%	6.1%	5.7%
1991	-0.5%	-2.0%	6.8%	3.1%	-0.1%
		1992 - 20	01 Cycle		
1992	3.0%	3.1%	7.5%	2.9%	1.6%
1993	2.7%	3.4%	6.9%	2.7%	0.2%
1994	4.0%	5.5%	6.1%	2.7%	1.7%
1995	3.7%	4.8%	5.6%	2.5%	2.3%
1996	4.5%	4.3%	5.4%	3.3%	2.8%
1997	4.5%	7.3%	4.9%	1.7%	-1.2%
1998	4.2%	5.8%	4.5%	1.6%	0.0%
1999	3.7%	4.5%	4.2%	2.7%	2.9%
2000	4.1%	4.0%	4.0%	3.4%	3.6%
2001	1.1%	-3.4%	4.7%	1.6%	-1.6%
		2002 - 20	09 Cycle		
2002	1.8%	0.2%	5.8%	2.4%	1.2%
2003	2.5%	1.2%	6.0%	1.9%	4.0%
2004	3.5%	2.3%	5.5%	3.3%	4.2%
2005	3.1%	3.2%	5.1%	3.4%	5.4%
2006	2.7%	2.2%	4.6%	2.5%	1.1%
2007	1.9%	2.5%	4.6%	4.1%	6.2%
2008	-0.3%	-3.4%	5.8%	0.1%	-0.9%
2009	-3.1%	-11.3%	9.3%	2.7%	4.3%
	,	Curren	t Cycle		
2010	2.4%	5.7%	9.6%	1.5%	3.8%
2011	2. 4 % 1.8%	3.4%	9.0 <i>%</i> 8.9%	3.0%	3.6% 4.7%
	1.070	J. T /U	U. 37 /U	J.Ų /0	+ / /0

^{*}GDP=Gross Domestic Product

Source: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Indicators, various issues.

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Year	Real GDP* Growth	Industrial Production Growth	Unemploy- ment Rate	Consumer Price Index	Producer Price Inde
**					
2002		·			
1st Qtr.	2.7%	-3.8%	5.6%	2.8%	4.4%
2nd Qtr.	2.2%	-1.2%	5.9%	0.9%	-2.0%
3rd Qtr.	2.4%	0.8%	5.8%	2.4%	1.2%
4th Qtr.	0.2%	1.4%	5.9%	1.6%	0.4%
2003					
1st Qtr.	1.2%	1.1%	5.8%	4.8%	5.6%
2nd Qtr.	3.5%	-0.9%	6.2%	0.0%	-0.5%
3rd Qtr.	7.5%	-0.9%	6.1%	3.2%	3.2%
4th Qtr.	2.7%	1.5%	5.9%	-0.3%	[^] 2.8%
2004	0.00/	0.004	5 001	5.004	
1st Qtr.	3.0%	2.8%	5.6%	5.2%	5.2%
2nd Qtr.	3.5%	4.9%	5.6%	4.4%	4.4%
3rd Qtr.	3.6%	4.6%	5.4%	0.8%	0.8%
4th Qtr.	2.5%	4.3%	5.4%	3.6%	7.2%
2005	4.1%	2 00/	E 20/	A A01	E 60/
1st Qtr. 2nd Qtr.	4.1% 1.7%	3.8% 3.0%	5.3% 5.1%	4.4% 1.6%	5.6% -0.4%
2nd Qir. 3rd Qtr.	3.1%	3.0% 2.7%	5.1% 5.0%	1.5% 8.8%	-0.4% 14.0%
4th Qtr.	2.1%	2.9%	4.9%	-2.0%	4.0%
2006					
1st Qtr.	5.4%	3.4%	4.7%	4.8%	-0.2%
2nd Qtr.	1.4%	4.5%	4.6%	4.8%	5.6%
3rd Qtr.	0.1%	5.2%	4.7%	0.4%	-4.4%
4th Qtr.	3.0%	3.5%	4.5%	0.0%	3.6%
2007					
1st Qtr.	0.9%	2.5%	4.5%	4.8%	6.4%
2nd Qtr.	3.2%	1.6%	4.5%	5.2%	6.8%
3rd Qtr.	2.3%	1.8%	4.6%	1.2%	1.2%
4th Qtr.	2.9%	1.7%	4.8%	6.4%	10.8%
2008					
1st Qtr.	-1.8%	1.9%	4.9%	2.8%	9.6%
2nd Qtr.	1.3%	0.2%	5.3%	7.6%	14.0%
3rd Qtr.	-3.7%	-3.0%	6.0%	2.8%	-0.4%
4th Qtr.	-8.9%	6.0%	6.9%	-13.2%	-28.4%
2009	E 20/	44 00/	0.402	0.404	0.404
1st Qtr. 2nd Qtr.	-5.3% -0.3%	-11.6% 12.9%	8.1% 9.3%	2.4%	-0.4%
zna Qtr. 3rd Qtr.	-0.3% 1.4%	-12.9% -9.3%	9.3% 9.6%	3.2% 2.0%	9.2% _n.8%
4th Qtr.	4.0%	-9.5% -4.5%	9.6% 10.0%	2.0% 2.5%	-0.8% 8.8%
2010					
2010 1st Qtr.	2.3%	2.7%	9.7%	0.9%	C E0/
ist Qtr. 2nd Qtr.	2.3% 2.2%	2.7% 6.5%	9.7%	0.9% -1.2%	6.5% -2.4%
2110 Qtr. 3rd Qtr.	2.2% 2.6%	6.9%	9.7%	-1.2% 2.8%	-2.4% 4.0%
4th Qtr.	2.4%	6.2%	9.6%	2.8%	9.2%
2011					
1st Qtr.	0.1%	5.4%	9.0%	4.8%	9.6%
2nd Qtr.	2.5%	3.6%	9.0%	3.2%	3.6%
3rd Qtr.	1.3%	3.3%	9.1%	2.4%	6.4%
4th Qtr.	4.1%	4.0%	8.7%	0.4%	-1.2%
2012					
1st Qtr.	2.0%	4.5%	8.3%	3.2%	2.0%
2nd Qtr.	1.3%	4.7%	8.2%	0.0%	-2.8%
3rd Qtr.	3.1%	3.4%	8.1%	4.0%	9.6%
4th Qtr.	0.4%	2.8%	7.8%	0.0%	-3.6%
2013	•				
1st Qtr.	1.8%	2.4%	7.7%	2.0%	0.8%
2nd Qtr.	1.7%		7.6%		

*GDP=Gross Domestic Product

Source: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Indicators, various issues.

INTEREST RATES

Year	Prime Rate	US Treasury T Bills 3 Month	US Treasury T Bonds 10 Year	Utility Bonds Aaa	Utility Bonds Aa	Utility Bonds A	Utility Bonds Baa
						•	
			1975 - 1982	•			
1975	7.86%	5.84%	7.99%	9.03%	9.44%	10.09%	10.96%
1976	6.84%	4.99%	7.61%	8.63%	8.92%	9.29%	9.82%
1977	6.83%	5.27%	7.42%	8.19%	8.43%	8.61%	9.06%
1978	9.06%	7.22%	8. 4 1%	8.87%	9.10%	9.29%	9.62%
1979	12.67%	10.04%	9.44%	9.86%	10.22%	10.49%	10.96%
1980	15.27%	11.51%	11. 4 6%	12.30%	13.00%	13.34%	13.95%
1981	18.89%	14.03%	13.93%	14.64%	15.30%	15.95%	16.60%
1982	14.86%	10.69%	13.00%	14.22%	14.79%	15.86%	16.45%
			1983 - 1991 (Cycle		•	
1983	10.79%	8.63%	11.10%	12.52%	12.83%	13.66%	14.20%
1984	12.04%	9.58%	12.44%	12.72%	13.66%	14.03%	14.53%
1985	9.93%	7.48%	10.62%	11.68%	12.06%	12.47%	12.96%
1986	8.33%	5.98%	7.68%	8.92%	9.30%	9.58%	10.00%
1987	8.21%	5.82%	8.39%	9.52%	9.77%	10.10%	10.53%
1988	9.32%	6.69%	8.85%	10.05%	10.26%	10.49%	11.00%
1989	10.87%	8.12%	8.49%	9.32%	9.56%	9.77%	9.97%
1990	10.01%	7.51%	8.55%	9.45%	9.65%	9.86%	10.06%
1991	8.46%	5.42%	7.86%	8.85%	9.09%	9.36%	9.55%
			1992 - 2001 (Cycle			
1992	6.25%	3.45%	7.01%	8.19%	8.55%	8.69%	8.86%
1993	6.00%	3.02%	5.87%	7.29%	7.44%	7.59%	7.91%
1994	7.15%	4.29%	7.09%	8.07%	8.21%	8.31%	8.63%
1995	8.83%	5.51%	6.57%	7.68%	7.77%	7.89%	8.29%
1996	8.27%	5.02%	6.44%	7.48%	7.57%	7.75%	8.16%
1997	8.44%	5.07%	6.35%	7.43%	7.54%	7.60%	7.95%
1998	8.35%	4.81%	5.26%	6.77%	6.91%	7.04%	7.26%
1999	8.00%	4.66%	5.65%	7.21%	7.51%	7.62%	7.88%
2000	9.23%	5.85%	6.03%	7.88%	8.06%	8.24%	8.36%
2001	6.91%	3.44%	5.02%	7.47%	7.59%	7.78%	8.02%
			2002 - 2009 (Cycle	÷		•
2002	4.67%	1.62%	4.61%	[-	1] 7.19%	7.37%	8.02%
2003	4.12%	1.01%	4.01%		6.40%	6.58%	6.84%
2004	4.34%	1.38%	4.27%		6.04%	6.16%	6.40%
2005	6.19%	3.16%	4.29%		5.44%	5.65%	5.93%
2006	7.96%	4.73%	4.80%		5.84%	6.07%	6.32%
2007	8.05%	4.41%	4.63%		5.94%	6.07%	6.33%
2008	5.09%	1.48%	3.66%		6.18%	6.53%	7.25%
2009	3.25%	0.16%	3.26%	·	5.75%	6.04%	7.06%
			Current Cy	rcle			
2010	3.25%	0.14%	3.22%		5.24%	5.46%	5.96%
2011	3.25%	0.06%	2.78%		4.78%	5.04%	5.57%
2012	3.25%	0.09%	1.80%		3.83%	4.13%	4.86%

^[1] Note: Moody's has not published Aaa utility bond yields since 2001.

Sources: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Indicators; Moody's Bond Record; Federal Reserve Bulletin; various issues.

INTEREST RATES

	Prime Rate	US Treasury T Bills 3 Month	US Treasury T Bonds 10 Year	Utility Utility Bonds Bonds Aaa [1] Aa	Utility Bonds A	Utilii Bond Baa
<u> </u>	. 1416	ona1	19 1 5 01		- M	Dag
2007						
Jan	8.25%	4.96%	4.76%	5.78%	5.96%	6.16
Feb	8.25%	5.02%	4.72%	5.73%	5.90%	6.10
Mar	8.25%	4.97%	4.56%	5.66%	5.85%	6.10
Apr May	8.25% 8.25%	4.88% 4.77%	4.69% 4.75%	5.83% 5.86%	5.97%	6.24
June	8.25%	4.63%	4./5% 5.10%	5.66% 6.18%	5.99% 6.30%	6.23° 6.54°
July	8.25%	4.84%	5.00%	6.11%	6.25%	6.49
Aug	8.25%	4.34%	4.67%	6.11%	6.24%	6.51
Sept	7.75%	4.01%	4.52%	6.10%	6.18%	6.45
Oct	7.50%	3.97%	4.53%	6.04%	6.11%	6.36
Nov	7.50%	3.49%	4.15%	5.87%	5.97%	6.27
Dec	7.25%	3.08%	4.10%	6.03%	6.16%	6.51
2008				·		
Jan Feb	6.00% 6.00%	2.86% 2.21%	3.74% 3.74%	5.87% 6.04%	6.02% 6.21%	6.35
Mar	5.25%	1.38%	3.51%	5.99%	6.21%	6.60° 6.68°
Apr	5.00%	1.32%	3.68%	5.99%	6.29%	6.82
May	5.00%	1.71%	3.88%	6.07%	6.27%	6.79
June	5.00%	1.90%	4.10%	6.19%	6.38%	6.93
July	5.00%	1.72%	4.01%	6.13%	6.40%	6.97
Aug	5.00%	1.79%	3.89%	6.09%	6.37%	6.98
Sept	5.00%	1.46%	3.69%	6.13%	6.49%	7.15
Oct	4.00%	0.84%	3.81%	6.95%	7.56%	8.58
Nov Dec	4.00% 3.25%	0.30% 0.04%	3.53% 2.42%	6.83% 5.93%	7.60% 6.54%	8.98° 8.13°
2009				3.00,0	/4	5.10
Jan	3.25%	0.12%	2.52%	6.01%	6.39%	7.90
Feb	3.25%	0.31%	2.87%	6.11%	6.30%	7.74
Mar	3.25%	0.25%	2,82%	6.14%	6.42%	8.00
Арг	3.25%	0.17%	2.93%	6.20%	6.48%	8.03
May	3.25%	0.15%	3.29%	6.23%	6.49%	7.76
June	3.25%	0.17%	3.72%	6.13%	6.20%	7.30
July	3.25%	0.19%	3.56%	5.63%	5.97%	6.87
Aug	3.25%	0.18%	3.59%	5.33%	5.71%	6.36
Sept Oct	3.25% 3.25%	0.13% 0.08%	3.40% 3.39%	5.15% 5.23%	5.53% 5.55%	6.12
Nov	3.25% 3.25%	0.05% 0.05%	3.40%	5.23% 5.33%	5.55% 5.64%	6.14° 6.18°
Dec	3.25%	0.07%	3.59%	5.52%	5.79%	6.26
2010						
Jan	3.25%	0.06%	3.73%	5.55%	5.77%	6.16
Feb	3.25%	0.10%	3.69%	5.69%	5.87%	6.25
Mar	3.25%	0.15%	3.73%	5.64%	5.84%	6.22
Арг	3.25%	0.15%	3.85%	5.62%	5.81%	6.19
May	3.25%	0.16%	3.42%	5.29%	5.50%	5.97
June	3.25%	0.12%	3.20%	5.22%	5.46%	6.18
July	3.25%	0.16%	3.01%	4.99%	5.26%	5.989
Aug Sept	3.25% 3.25%	0.15% 0.15%	2.70% 2.65%	4.75% 4.74%	5.01%	5.559
Oct	3.25%	0.13%	2.54%	4.89%	5.01% 5.10%	5,539 5,629
Nov	3.25%	0.13%	2.76%	5.12%	5.37%	5.859
Dec	3.25%	0.15%	3.29%	5.32%	5.56%	6.049
2011		•				
Jan	3.25%	0.15%	3.39%	5.29%	5.57%	6.06
Feb	3.25%	0.14%	3.58%	5.42%	5.68%	6.109
Mar	3.25%	0.11%	3.41%	5.33%	5.56%	5.979
Apr	3.25% 3.25%	0.06%	3.46%	5.32%	5.55%	5.989
May June	3.25% 3.25%	0.04% 0.04%	3.17% 3.00%	5.08% 5.04%	5.32% 5.26%	5.749 5.679
July	3.25% 3.25%	0.04% 0.03%	3.00% 3.00%	5.04% 5.05%	5.26% 5.27%	5.57% 5.70%
Aug	3.25%	0.05%	2.30%	4.44%	5.21% 4.69%	5.229
Sept	3.25%	0.02%	1.98%	4.24%	4.48%	5.221 5.119
Oct	3.25%	0.02%	2.15%	4.21%	4.52%	5.249
Nov	3.25%	0.01%	2.01%	3.92%	4.25%	4.939
Dec	3.25%	0.02%	1.98%	4.00%	4.33%	5.079
2012	0.0501		4 484			_
Jan	3.25%	0.02%	1.97%	4.03%	4.34%	5.069
Feb	3.25%	0.08%	1.97%	4.02%	4.36%	5.029
Mar Apr	3.25% 3.25%	0.09% 0.08%	2.17%	4.16% 4.10%	4.48%	5.139
Apr May	3.25% 3.25%	0.08% 0.09%	2.05% 1.80%	4.10% 3.92%	4.40%	5.119
May June	3.25% 3.25%	0.09% 0.09%	1.80% 1.62%	3.92% 3.79%	4.20% 4.08%	4.979 4.919
July	3.25% 3.25%	0.09% 0.10%	1.53%	3.79% 3.58%	4.08% 3.93%	4.915 4.859
Aug	3.25% 3.25%	0.10% 0.11%	1.68%	3.65%	3.93% 4.00%	4.889 4.889
Sept	3.25%	0.10%	1.72%	3.69%	4.00%	4.819
Oct	3.25%	0.10%	1.75%	3.68%	4.02% 3.91%	4.549
Nov	3.25%	0.11%	1.65%	3.60%	3.84%	4.429
Dec	3.25%	0.08%	1.72%	3.75%	4.00%	4.569
2013	ን ጎደበ/	A A70/	4.040/	2 2201	4 4501	,
Jan Feb	3,25% 3.25%	0.07% 0.10%	1.91% 1.98%	3.90% 3.95%	4.15% 4.18%	4.669 4.749
Mar	3.25%	0.09%	1.96%	3.90%	4.15%	4.747
Apr	3.25% 3.25%	0.05%	1.76%	3.90% 3.74%	4.00%	4.007 4.499
May	3.25%	0.05%	1.93%	3.91%	4.00%	4.457
		0.05%	2.30%	4.27%	4.53%	5.089
June	3.25%	0.05%	Z.JU/0	7 7 1 70	- Carry 211	

[1] Note: Moody's has not published Aaa utility bond yields since 2001.

Sources: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Indicators; Moody's Bond Record; Federal Reserve Bulletin; various issues.

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STOCK PRICE INDICATORS

	S&P N Composite [1] Con	IASDAQ nposite [1]	DJIA	S&P D/P	S&P E/P
		1975 - 1982	Cycle		
1975		-	802.49	4.31%	9.15%
1976			974.92	3.77%	8.90%
1977		•	894.63	4.62%	10.79%
1978			820.23	5.28%	12.03%
1979			844.40	5.47%	13.46%
1980	,		891.41	5.26%	12.66%
1981			932.92	5.20%	11.96%
1982			884.36	5.81%	11.60%
		1983 - 1991	Cycle		
1983			1,190.34	4.40%	8.03%
1984			1,178.48	4.64%	10.02%
1985			1,328.23	4.25%	8.12%
1986			1,792.76	3.49%	6.09%
1987			2,275.99	3.08%	5.48%
1988	[1]	[1]	2,060.82	3.64%	8.01%
1989	322.84		2,508.91	3.45%	7,41%
1990	334.59		2,678.94	3.61%	6.47%
1991	376.18	491.69	2,929.33	3.24%	4.79%
		1992 - 2001	~		
1992		§599.26	3,284.29	2.99%	4.22%
1993		715.16	3,522.06	2.78%	4.46%
1994		751.65	3,793.77	2.82%	5.83%
1995		925.19	4,493.76	2.56%	6.09%
1996		,164.96	5,742.89	2.19%	5.24%
1997		,469.49	7,441.15	1.77%	4.57%
1998		,794.91	8,625.52	1.49%	3.46%
1999	·	2,728.15	10,464.88	1.25%	3.17%
2000 2001		2,783.67 2,035.00	10,734.90 10,189.13	1.15% 1.32%	3.63% 2.95%
	•	2002 - 2009	Cvcle		÷
2002		,539.73	9,226.43	1.61%	2.92%
2003		,647.17	8,993.59	1.77%	3.84%
2004		,986.53	10,317.39	1.72%	4.89%
2005	•	,099.32	10,547.67	1.83%	5.36%
2006	1,310.46 2	2,263.41	11,408.67	1.87%	5.78%
2007	1,477.19 2	,578.47	13,169.98	1.86%	5.29%
2008	1,220.04 2	,161.65	11,252.62	2.37%	3.54%
2009	948.05 1	,845.38	8,876.15	2.40%	1.86%
		Current C		•	
2010	•	2,349.89	10,662.80	1.98%	6.04%
2011		2,677.44	11,966.36	2.05%	6.77%
2012	1,379.35 2	2,965.56	12,967.08	2.24%	6.20%

^[1] Note: this source did not publish the S&P Composite prior to 1988 and the NASDAQ Composite prior to 1991.

Source: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Indicators, various issues.

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STOCK PRICE INDICATORS

	S&P Composite	NASDAQ Composite	DJIA	S&P D/P	S&P E/P
					<u> </u>
2004					
1st Qtr.	1,133.29	2,041.95	10,488.43	1.64%	4.62%
2nd Qtr.	1,122.87	1,984.13	10,289.04	1.71%	4.92%
3rd Qtr.	1,104.15	1,872.90	10,129.85	1.79%	5.18%
4th Qtr.	1,162.07	2,050.22	10,362.25	1.75%	4.83%
2005					
1st Qtr.	1,191.98	2,056.01	10,648.48	1.77%	5.11%
2nd Qtr.	1,181.65	2,012.24	10,382.35	1.85%	5.32%
3rd Qtr.	1,225.91	2,144.61	10,532.24	1.83%	5.42%
4th Qtr.	1,262.07	2,246.09	10,827.79	1.86%	5.60%
2006					•
1st Qtr.	1,283.04	2,287.97	10,996.04	1.85%	5.61%
2nd Qtr.	1,281.77	2,240.46	11,188.84	1.90%	5.86%
3rd Qtr.	1,288.40	2,141.97	11,100.04	1.90%	5.88%
4th Qtr.	1,389.48	2,390.26	12,175.30	1.81%	5.75%
	-,	m, 300.20	12 ₁ 11 0.00	1.0170	0.7 0 70
2007	4 405 00	0 444 05	40 470 07	4.0404	= 4
1st Qtr.	1,425.30	2,444.85	12,470.97	1.84%	5.85%
2nd Qtr.	1,496.43	2,552.37	13,214.26	1.82%	5.65%
3rd Qtr.	1,490.81	2,609.68	13,488.43	1.86%	5.15%
4th Qtr.	1,494.09	2,701.59	13,502.95	1.91%	4.51%
2008					
1st Qtr.	1,350.19	2,332.91	12,383.86	2.11%	4.55%
2nd Qtr.	1,371.65	2,426.26	12,508.59	2.10%	4.05%
3rd Qtr.	1,251.94	2,290.87	11,322.40	2.29%	3.94%
4th Qtr.	909.80	1,599.64	8,795.61	2.98%	1.65%
2009			·		
1st Qtr.	809.31	1,485.14	7,774.06	3.00%	0.86%
2nd Qtr.	892.23	1,731.41			
3rd Qtr.	996.68	1,985.25	8,327.83	2.45%	0.82%
4th Qtr.	1,088.70	2,162.33	9,229.93 10,172.78	2.16%	1.19%
Tui Qu.	1,000.70	2,102.33	10,172.70	1.99%	4.57%
2010					
1st Qtr.	1,121.60	2,274.88	10,454.42	1.94%	5.21%
2nd Qtr.	1,135.25	2,343.40	10,570.54	1.97%	6.51%
3rd Qtr.	1,096.39	2,237.97	10,390.24	2.09%	6.30%
4th Qtr.	1,204.00	2,534.62	11,236.02	1.95%	6.15%
2011	•				
1st Qtr.	1,302.74	2,741.01	12,024.62	1.85%	6.13%
2nd Qtr.	1,319.04	2,766.64	12,370.73	1.97%	6.35%
3rd Qtr.	1,237.12	2,613.11	11,671.47	2.15%	7.69%
4th Qtr.	1,225.65	2,600.91	11,798.65	2.25%	6.91%
2012					
1st Qtr.	1,347.44	2,902.90	12,839.80	2.12%	e 200/
2nd Qtr.	1,350.39	2,928.62	12,765.58	2.12%	6.29% 6.45%
3rd Qtr.	1,402.21	3,029.86	13,118.72		
4th Qtr.	1,402.21 1,418.21	3,029.86 3,001.69	13,118.72 13,142.91	2.27% 2.28%	6.00% 6.07%
2040					
2013	4 6 4 4 4 4	:-			
1st Qtr.	1,514.41	3,177.10	14,000.30	2.21%	5.59%
2nd Qtr.	1,609.77	3,369.49	14,961.28	2.15%	

Source: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Indicators, various issues.

Exhibit DCP-3 Page 1 of 2

DELMARVA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY DEBT RATINGS

	Senio	or Unsecured Deb	Senior Secured Debt			
Date	Moody's	S&P	Fitch	Moody's	S&P	Fitch
2007	Baa2	BBB-	A-	Baa1	BBB+	Α
2008	Baa2	BBB	A -	Baa1	A-	Α
2009	Baa2	BBB	A -	A3	A-	Α
2010	Baa2	BBB+	A-	A3	Ä	Α
2011	Baa2	BBB+	A-	A3	Α	A
2012	Baa2	BBB+	A -	A 3	Α	Α
2013	Baa2	BBB+	A-	A3	Α	Α

Source: Response to Request No. AG-COC-6

PEPCO HOLDINGS AND REGULATED SUBSIDIARIES DEBT RATINGS

Rating Agency	Delmarva Power & Light Co	Potomac Electric Power Co	Atlantic City Electric Co	Pepco Holdings
Senior Unsecured Debt	t			
Standard & Poor's	BBB+	BBB+	BBB+	BBB
Moody's	Baa2	Baa2	Baa2	Baa3
Fitch	A-	A-	BBB+	BBB
Senior Secured Debt				
Standard & Poor's	Α	Α	Α	
Moody's	A3	A3	A3	
Fitch	Α	Α	Α-	

Source: Response to Request No. AG-COC-6

DELMARVA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS 2008 - 2012 (\$000)

YEAR	COMMON EQUITY	LONG-TERM DEBT	SHORT-TERM DEBT
2008	\$752,436 44.8% 49.2%	\$775,513 46.2% 50.8%	\$150,000 8.9%
2009	\$807,496 50.7% 50.7%	\$784,948 49.3% 49.3%	\$0 0.0%
2010	\$840,213 49.3% 49.3%	\$862,947 50.7% 50.7%	\$0 0.0%
2011	\$851,342 48.3% 49.6%	\$864,769 49.0% 50.4%	\$47,000 2.7%
2012	\$984,604 48.4% 49.2%	\$1,015,954 50.0% 50.8%	\$32,000 1.6%

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding.

Source: Response to AG-COC-4.

PEPCO HOLDINGS, INC. CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS 2008 - 2012 (\$000)

		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
YEAR	COMMON EQUITY	PREFERRED STOCK	LONG-TERM DEBT	SHORT-TERM DEBT
2008	\$4,188,842 43.8%	\$6,215 0.1%	\$5,043,117 52.7%	\$325,000 3.4%
	45.3%	0.1%	54.6%	J.+70
2009	\$4,254,824	\$6,215	\$5,209,426	\$384,000
	43.2% 44.9%	0.1% 0.1%	52.9% 55.0%	3.9%
2010	\$4,228,874	\$6,215	\$3,802,483	\$388,000
	50.2%	0.1%	45.1%	4.6%
	52.6%	0.1%	47.3%	
2011	\$4,333,932 48.6%		\$4,003,211 44.9%	\$586,000 6.6%
	52.0%		48.0%	0.070
2012	\$4,446,000		\$4,316,934	\$837,000
	46.3% 50.7%		45.0% 49.3%	8.7%

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding.

Source: Response to AG-COC-4.

PEPCO HOLDINGS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS December 31, 2012 (\$000)

COMPANY	COMMON EQUITY	LONG-TERM DEBT	SHORT-TERM DEBT
Delmarva Power & Light Co.	\$984,604,304 49.2% 49.2%	\$1,015,954,082 50.8% 50.8%	\$32,000 0.0%
Potomac Electric Power Co.	\$1,643,194 46.6% 49.8%	\$1,655,194 46.9% 50.2%	\$231,000 6.5%
Atlantic City Electric Co.	\$800,998 45.9% 48.9%	\$835,738 47.8% 51.1%	\$110,000 6.3%
Pepco Holdings, Inc.	\$4,446,000 46.3% 50.7%	\$4,316,934 45.0% 49.3%	\$837,000 8.7%

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding.

Source: Response to AG-COC-5.

AUS UTILITY REPORTS ELECTRIC UTILITY GROUPS AVERAGE COMMON EQUITY RATIOS

Year	Electric	Combination Electric and Gas
2008	45%	43%
2009	46%	45%
2010	46%	46%
2011	47%	46%
2012	47%	46%

Note: Averages include short-term debt.

Source: AUS Utility Reports.

PROXY COMPANIES BASIS FOR SELECTION

Company	Market Cap (\$000) (1)	Percent Revenues Electric (2)		Value Line Safety Rank (4)	S&P Stock Ranking (5)	Moody's/ S&P Bond Rating (6)
Pepco Holdings Delmarva Power & Light	\$4,500,000	83%	51%	3	В	Baa1/Baa2/A-/BBB+ A3/A
Proxy Group						
ALLETE	\$1,900,000	91%	56%	2	В	A2/A-
Alliant Energy	\$5,400,000	84%	48%	2	В	A2/A3/A-
Avista Corp.	\$1,600,000	63%	49%	2	A-	A3/A-
Black Hills Corp	\$2,100,000	52%	57%	3	В	A3/BBB+
IDACORP	\$2,400,000	100%	55%	3	B+	A2/A-
MGE Eneregy	\$1,300,000	72%	62%	1	B+	A1/AA-
Northwestern Energy	\$1,600,000	75%	46%	3		A2/A-
Portland General Electric	\$2,400,000	100%	53%	2		A3/A-
TECO Eneregy	\$3,700,000	65%	44%	2	В	A3/BBB+
Westar Energy	\$4,000,000	100%	49%	2	B+	A3/BBB+
Wisconsin Energy	\$9,500,000	75%	48%	1	A-	A2/A3/A-/BBB+

Criteria For Selection:

Market Cap of \$1 billion to \$10 billion.

Percent electric revenues of 50% or greater
Common equity ratio of 40% or greater
Value Line Safety Rank of 1, 2, or 3

S&P Stock Ranking of A or B

Moody's or S&P Bond Rating of A..

Currently pays common stock dividends.

Not currently involved in major merger.

Sources:

- (1) Value Line May 24, 2013, June 21, 2013 and August 2, 2013 editions.
- (2) AUS Utility Reports, May, 2013 edition, 2012 data.
- (3) Value Line May 24, 2013, June 21, 2013 and August 2, 2013 editions, excludes short-term debt.
- (4) Value Line May 24, 2013, June 21, 2013 and August 4, 2013 editions.
- (5) Value Line May 24, 2013, June 21, 2013 and August2, 2013 editions.
- (6) AUS Utility Reports, May, 2013 edition.

PROXY COMPANIES DIVIDEND YIELD

	Qtr		May - J	uly, 2013		
COMPANY	DPS	DPS	HIGH	LOW	AVERAGE	YIELD
Parcell Proxy Group						
ALLETE	\$0.475	\$1.90	\$54 .13	\$46.85	\$50.49	3.76%
Alliant Energy	\$0.470	\$1.88	\$54.18	\$46.79	\$50.49	3.72%
Avista Corp.	\$0.305	\$1.22	\$29.26	\$25.68	\$27.47	4.44%
Black Hills Corp	\$0.380	\$1.52	\$54.12	\$45.07	\$49.60	3.06%
IDACORP .	\$0.380	\$1.52	\$53.10	\$46.03	\$49.57	3.07%
MGE Eneregy	\$0.395	\$1.58	\$60.69	\$52.12	\$56.41	2.80%
Northwestern Energy	\$0.380	\$1.52	\$44.33	\$38.12	\$41.23	3.69%
Pepco Holdings	\$0.270	\$1.08	\$22.72	\$19.19	\$20.96	5.15%
Portland General Electric	\$0.275	\$1.10	\$32.91	\$29.14	\$31.03	3.15 <i>%</i>
TECO Eneregy	\$0.220	\$0.88	\$19.22	\$16.40	\$17.81	3.55 % 4.94%
Westar Energy	\$0.340	\$1.36	\$34.92	\$30.13	\$17.81 \$32.53	
Wisconsin Energy	\$0.340	\$1.36	\$44.84	\$39.04	\$41.94	4.18% 3.24%
Average						3.80%
Hevert Proxy Group						
American Electric Power Co	\$0.490	\$1.96	\$51.60	\$42.83	\$47.22	4.15%
Cleco Corp	\$0.362	\$1.45	\$49.40	\$43.75	\$46.58	3.11%
Empire District Electric	\$0.250	\$1.00	\$24.32	\$21.26	\$22.79	4.39%
Breat Plains Energy	\$0.217	\$0.87	\$24.65	\$21.73	\$23.19	3.74%
lawaiian Electric Industries	\$0.310	\$1.24	\$28.24	\$23.84	\$26.04	4.76%
DACORP	\$0.380	\$1.52	\$53.10	\$46.03	\$49.57	3.07%
Otter Tail Corp.	\$0.297	\$1.19	\$31.88	\$26.50	\$29.19	4.07%
Pinnacle West Cajpital	\$0.545	\$2.18	\$61.89	\$51.56	\$56.73	3.84%
PNM Resources, Inc.	\$0.165	\$0.66	\$24.14	\$21.11	\$22.63	2.92%
Portland General Electric	\$0.275	\$1.10	\$32.91	\$29.14	\$31.03	3.55%
Southern Company	\$0.507	\$2.03	\$48.30	\$42.32	\$45.31	4.48%
Vestar Energy	\$0.340	\$1.36	\$34.92	\$30.13	\$32.53	4.18%
verage			······································			3.85%

Source: Yahoo! Finance.

PROXY COMPANIES RETENTION GROWTH RATES

COMPANY	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Average	2013	2014	2016-'18	Average
Parcell Proxy Group			·							
ALLETE	3.9%	0.5%	1.5%	2.9%	2.3%	2.2%	2.5%	2.5%	3.5%	2.8%
Alliant Energy	3.8%	0.9%	3.8%	3.3%	3.9%	3.1%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%
Avista Corp.	3.7%	4.1%	3.3%	3.1%	0.8%	3.0%	2.5%	2.5%	3.0%	2.7%
Black Hills Corp	0.0%	3.2%	0.7%	0.0%	1.8%	1.1%	3.0%	3.5%	4.0%	3.5%
DACORP	3.4%	4.8%	5.5%	6.5%	5.7%	5.2%	4.5%	4.5%	4.0%	4.3%
MGE Eneregy	4.4%	3.4%	4.4%	4.7%	4.9%	4.4%	5.5%	5.5%	5.5%	5.5%
Northwestern Energy	2.3%	3.2%	3.5%	4.7%	3.2%	3.4%	4.0%	4.0%	3.5%	3.8%
Pepco Holdings	4.2%	0.0%	0.8%	0.3%	0.8%	1.2%	0.5%	1.0%	2.5%	1.3%
Portland General Electric	2.0%	1.5%	3.0%	4.1%	3.5%	2.8%	3.0%	3.0%	2.5 % 3.5%	3.2%
TECO Eneregy	0.0%	2.1%	3.1%	3.9%	2.4%	2.3%	0.5%	2.0%	4.0%	2.2%
Westar Energy	1.2%	0.8%	3.1%	2.7%	4.0%	2.4%	3.5%	3.5%	4.0 <i>%</i> 4.5%	3.8%
Wisconsin Energy	7.0%	6.2%	7.0%	6.8%	6.5%	6.7%	5.5%	5.5%	5.0%	5.3%
Average						3.2%		-		3.6%
Hevert Proxy Group								·		<u> </u>
American Electric Power Co	5.1%	4.6%	3.1%	4.2%	3.5%	4.1%	3.5%	4.0%	4.0%	3.8%
Cleco Corp	4.5%	4.7%	6.1%	6.3%	5.7%	5.5%	4.0%	5.0%	4.5%	4.5%
Empire District Electric	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.1%	1.9%	1.2%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%
Great Plains Energy	0.0%	0.9%	3.4%	2.0%	2.2%	1.7%	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%
Hawaiian Electric Industries	0.5%	0.0%	1.4%	2.1%	4.2%	1.6%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%
DACORP	3.4%	4.8%	5.5%	6.5%	5.7%	5.2%	4.5%	4.5%	4.0%	4.3%
Otter Tail Corp.	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	2.5%	4.0%	2.5%
Pinnacle West Cajpital	0.3%	0.7%	3.1%	2.8%	4.1%	2.2%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%
PNM Resources, Inc.	0.0%	0.4%	2.2%	3.3%	3.8%	1.9%	4.0%	3.5%	4.5%	4.0%
Portland General Electric	2.0%	1.5%	3.0%	4.1%	3.5%	2.8%	3.0%	3.0%	3.5%	3.2%
Southern Company	3.5%	3.2%	3.0%	3.4%	3.6%	3.3%	3.5%	3.5%	4.0%	3.7%
Westar Energy	1.2%	0.8%	3.1%	2.7%	4.0%	2.4%	3.5%	3.5%	4.5%	3.8%
\verage						2.7%				3.4%

Source: Value Line Investment Survey.

PROXY COMPANIES PER SHARE GROWTH RATES

	5-	Year Historic	Growth Ra	ites	Est'd '10-'12 to '16-'18 Growth Rates			
COMPANY	EPS	DPS	BVPS	Average	EPS	DPS	BVPS	Average
			<u> </u>					
Parcell Proxy Group								
ALLETE	-2.5%	4.5%	5.5%	2.5%	7.0%	3.5%	4.0%	4.8%
Alliant Energy	4.0%	8.0%	3.5%	5.2%	5.0%	4.5%	4.0%	4.5%
Avista Corp.	8.5%	14.0%	4.0%	8.8%	4.0%	4.5%	3.0%	3.8%
Black Hills Corp	-8.0%	2.0%	3.0%	-1.0%	11.5%	2.5%	3.0%	5.7%
DACORP	10.0%	1.0%	5.5%	5.5%	2.0%	7.0%	4.5%	4.5%
MGE Eneregy	6.0%	2.0%	5.5%	4.5%	4.5%	3.5%	5.0%	4.3%
Northwestern Energy	9.0%	4.0%	2.5%	5.2%	4.5%	4.0%	4.5%	4.3%
Pepco Holdings	-4.5%	1.5%	0.5%	-0.8%	6.0%	1.0%	2.0%	3.0%
Portland General Electric	4.0%	14.5%	2.0%	6.8%	3.5%	3.0%	3.5%	3.3%
TECO Eneregy	0.5%	2.0%	4.0%	2.2%	3.5%	2.0%	2.5%	2.7%
Westar Energy	1.5%	5.0%	4.5%	3.7%	6.0%	3.0%	5.0%	4.7%
Wisconsin Energy	10.0%	17.0%	7.0%	11.3%	5.5%	12.0%	3.5%	7.0%
Average				4.5%			<u>-</u>	4.4%
Hevert Proxy Group								
American Electric Power Co	1.0%	4.0%	4.5%	3.2%	4.5%	4.0%	4.0%	4.2%
Cleco Corp	13.0%	4.5%	9.0%	8.8%	5.5%	10.0%	5.0%	6.8%
Empire District Electric	2.0%	-5.5%	1.0%	-0.8%	5.0%	3.5%	2.5%	3.7%
Great Plains Energy	-6.0%	-12.5%	5.0%	-4.5%	6.5%	6.0%	2.5%	5.0%
Hawaiian Electric Industries	2.0%	0.0%	2.0%	1.3%	3.5%	1.0%	4.5%	3.0%
DACORP	10.0%	1.0%	5.5%	5.5%	2.0%	7.0%	4.5%	4.5%
Otter Tail Corp.	-18.5%	0.5%	-1.0%	-6.3%	21.5%	1.5%	2.0%	8.3%
Pinnacle West Cajpital	2.5%	2.5%		2.5%	5.0%	2.0%	3.5%	3.5%
PNM Resources, Inc.	-4.0%	-9.0%	-2.0%	-5.0%	12.0%	12.5%	3.5%	9.3%
Portland General Electric	4.0%	14.5%	2.0%	6.8%	3.5%	3.0%	3.5%	3.3%
Southern Company	3.0%	4.0%	5.5%	4.2%	4.5%	3.5%	4.0%	4.0%
Westar Energy	1.5%	5.0%	4.5%	3.7%	6.0%	3.0%	5.0%	4.7%
Average		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		1.6%				5.0%

Source: Value Line Investment Survey.

PROXY COMPANIES DCF COST RATES

COMPANY	ADJUSTED YIELD	HISTORIC RETENTION GROWTH	PROSPECTIVE RETENTION GROWTH	HISTORIC PER SHARE GROWTH	PROSPECTIVE PER SHARE GROWTH	FIRST CALL EPS GROWTH	AVERAGE GROWTH	DCF RATES
Parcell Proxy Group								
ALLETE	3.8%	2.2%	2.8%	2.5%	4.8%	6.00%	3.7%	7.5%
Alliant Energy	3.8%	3.1%	4.5%	5.2%	4.5%	5.90%	4.6%	8.5%
Avista Corp.	4.5%	3.0%	2.7%	8.8%	3.8%	4.50%	4.6%	9.1%
Black Hills Corp	3.1%	1.1%	3.5%		5.7%	5.00%	3.8%	7.0%
DACORP	3.1%	5.2%	4.3%	5.5%	4.5%	4.00%	4.7%	7.8%
MGE Eneregy	2.9%	4.4%	5.5%	4.5%	4.3%	4.00%	4.5%	7.4%
Northwestern Energy	3.8%	3.4%	3.8%	5.2%	4.3%	4.00%	4.1%	7.9%
Pepco Holdings	5.2%	1.2%	1.3%		3.0%	4.23%	2.4%	7.7%
Portland General Electric	3.6%	2.8%	3.2%	6.8%	3.3%	6.52%	4.5%	8.2%
TECO Eneregy	5.0%	2.3%	2.2%	2.2%	2.7%	2.74%	2.4%	7.4%
Westar Energy	4.3%	2.4%	3.8%	3.7%	4.7%	3.90%	3.7%	7.9%
Wisconsin Energy	3.4%	6.7%	5.3%	11.3%	7.0%	4.89%	7.1%	10.4%
Mean	3.9%	3.2%	3.6%	5.6%	4.4%	4.6%	4.2%	8.1%
Median	3.8%	2.9%	3.7%	5.2%	4.4%	4.4%	4.3%	7.9%
Composite - Mean		7.0%	7.5%	9.4%	8.3%	8.5%	8.1%	· .
Composite - Median		6.7%	7.5%	9.0%	8.2%	8.2%	8.1%	
Hevert Proxy Group								
American Electric Power Co	4.2%	4.1%	3.8%	3.2%	4.2%	3.81%	3.8%	8.0%
Cleco Corp	3.2%	5.5%	4.5%	8.8%	6.8%	8.00%	6.7%	9.9%
Empire District Electric	4.4%	1.2%	2.5%	0.070	3.7%	3.00%	2.6%	7.0%
Great Plains Energy	3.8%	1.7%	3.0%		5.0%	6.26%	4.0%	7.8%
Hawaiian Electric Industries	4.8%	1.6%	2.0%	1.3%	3.0%	2.40%	4.0% 2.1%	6.9%
	3.1%	5.2%	4.3%		4.5%	4.00%	4.7%	7.8%
DACORP	3.1% 4.2%	J. 2 70	4.3% 2.5%	5.5%	4.5% 8.3%	4.00% 6.00%	4.7% 5.6%	9.8%
Otter Tail Corp.	4.∠% 3.9%	2.2%	2.5% 4.0%	2.5%	8.3% 3.5%	5.45%	3.5%	9.6% 7.4%
Pinnacle West Cajpital PNM Resources, Inc.	3.9% 3.0%	2.2% 1.9%	4.0% 4.0%	Z.J70	3.5% 9.3%	5.45% 6.43%	5.4%	7.4% 8.4%
Portland General Electric	3.0% 3.6%	1.9% 2.8%	4.0% 3.2%	6.8%	9.3% 3.3%	6.43% 6.52%	5.4% 4.5%	8.4% 8.2%
	4.6%	3.3%	3.7%	4.2%	4.0%	4.60%	4.5% 4.0%	8.5%
Southern Company Westar Energy	4.3%	2.4%	3.8%	3.7%	4.7%	3.90%	3.7%	7.9%
Mean	3.9%	2.9%	3.4%	4.5%	5.0%	5.0%	4.2%	8.2%
Median	4.0%	2.4%	3.8%	3.9%	4.3%	5.0%	4.0%	8.0%
Composite - Mean		6.8%	7.4%	8.4%	9.0%	9.0%	8.2%	
Composite - Median		6.4%	7.8%	8.0%	8.4%	9.1%	8.0%	

Note: negative values not used in calculations.

Sources: Prior pages of this schedule.

STANDARD & POOR'S 500 COMPOSITE 20-YEAR U.S. TREASURY BOND YIELDS RISK PREMIUMS

Year	EPS	BVPS	ROE	20-YEAR T-BOND YIELD	RISK PREMIUM
1977		\$79.07			
1978	\$12.33	\$85.35	15.00%	7.90%	7.10%
1979	\$14.86	\$94.27	16.55%	8.86%	7.69%
1980	\$14.82	\$102.48	15.06%	9.97%	5.09%
1981	\$15.36	\$109.43	14.50%	11.55%	2.95%
1982	\$12.64	\$112.46	11.39%	13.50%	-2.11%
1983	\$14.03	\$116.93	12.23%	10.38%	1.85%
1984	\$16.64	\$122.47	13.90%	11.74%	2.16%
1985	\$14.61	\$125.20	11.80%	11.25%	0.55%
1986	\$14.48	\$126.82	11.49%	8.98%	2.51%
1987	\$17.50	\$134.04	13.42%	7.92%	5.50%
1988	\$23.75	\$141.32	17.25%	8.97%	8.28%
1989	\$22.87	\$147.26	15.85%	8.81%	7.04%
1990	\$21.73	\$153.01	14.47%	8.19%	6.28%
1991	\$16.29	\$158.85	10.45%	8.22%	2.23%
1992	\$19.09	\$149.74	12.37%	7.29%	5.08%
1993	\$21.89	\$180.88	13.24%	7.17%	6.07%
1994	\$30.60	\$193.06	16.37%	6.59%	9.78%
1995	\$33.96	\$215.51	16.62%	7.60%	9.02%
1996	\$38.73	\$237.08	17.11%	6.18%	10.93%
1997	\$39.72	\$249.52	16.33%	6.64%	9.69%
1998	\$37.71	\$266.40	14.62%	5.83%	8.79%
1999	\$4 8.17	\$290.68	17.29%	5.57%	11.72%
2000	\$50.00	\$325.80	16.22%	6.50%	9.72%
2001	\$24.69	\$338.37	7.43%	5.53%	1.90%
2002	\$27.59	\$321.72	8.36%	5.59%	2.77%
2003	\$48.73	\$367.17	14.15%	4.80%	9.35%
2004	\$58.55	\$414.75	14.98%	5.02%	9.96%
2005	\$69.93	\$453.06	16.12%	4.69%	11.43%
2006	\$81.51	\$504.39	17.03%	4.68%	12.35%
2007	\$66.17	\$529.59	12.49%	4.86%	7.63%
2008	\$14.88	\$451.37	3.03%	4.45%	-1.42%
2009	\$50.97	\$513.58	10.56%	3.47%	7.09%
2010	\$77.35	\$579.14	14.16%	4.25%	9.91%
2011	\$86.58	\$613.14	14.52%	3.81%	10.71%
2012	\$86.51	\$666.97	13.52%	2.40%	11.12%
\verage			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·	6.59%

Source: Standard & Poor's Analysts' Handbook, Ibbotson Associates Handbook.

Exhibit DCP-9

PROXY COMPANIES CAPM COST RATES

COMPANY	RISK-FREE RATE	ВЕТА	RISK PREMIUM	CAPM RATES
Parceli Proxy Group				
ALLETE	3.04%	0.70	5.47%	6.9%
Alliant Energy	3.04%	0.70	5.47%	6.9%
Avista Corp.	3.04%	0.70	5.47%	6.9%
Black Hills Corp	3.04%	0.80	5.47%	7.4%
IDACORP	3.04%	0.70	5.47%	6.9%
MGE Eneregy	3.04%	0.60	5.47%	6.3%
Northwestern Energy	3.04%	0.70	5.47%	6.9%
Pepco Holdings	3.04%	0.75	5.47%	7.1%
Portland General Electric	3.04%	0.75	5.47%	7.1%
TECO Eneregy	3.04%	0.85	5.47%	7.7%
Westar Energy	3.04%	0.75	5.47%	7.1%
Wisconsin Energy	3.04%	0.60	5.47%	6.3%
Mean				7.0%
Median				6.9%
Hevert Proxy Group				,,
American Electric Power Co	3.04%	0.65	5.47%	6.6%
Cleco Corp	3.04%	0.65	5.47%	6.6%
Empire District Electric	3.04%	0.65	5.47%	6.6%
Great Plains Energy	3.04%	0.80	5.47%	7.4%
Hawaiian Electric Industries	3.04%	0.70	5.47%	6.9%
IDACORP	3.04%	0.70	5.47%	6.9%
Otter Tail Corp.	3.04%	0.90	5.47%	8.0%
Pinnacle West Cajpital	3.04%	0.70	5.47%	6.9%
PNM Resources, Inc.	3.04%	0.95	5.47%	8.2%
Portland General Electric	3.04%	0.75	5.47%	7.1%
Southern Company	3.04%	0.55	5.47%	6.0%
Westar Energy	3.04%	0.75	5.47%	7.1%
Mean				7.0%
····				

Sources: Value Line Investment Survey, Standard & Poor's Analysts' Handbook, Federal Reserve.

20-year Treas	ury Bonds
Month	Rate
May, 2013	2.73%
June, 2013	3.07%
July, 2013	3.31%
Average	3.04%

PROXY COMPANIES RATES OF RETURN ON AVERAGE COMMON EQUITY

COMPANY	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009 2	2010 X	2011 20	1992 2012 Ave	1992-2001 2002-2008 Average Average	2008 2009-2012 age Average	-2012 -age 2013	13 2014	2016-18
ALLETE ALLETE Aliant Energy Avista Corp Black Hills Corp DACORP MGE Eneregy Northwestern Energy Perco Holdings Portand General Electric TECO Eneregy Westar Energy	12.2% 11.7% 16.2% 13.1% 10.6% 12.9% 16.1%	11.5% 12.2% 14.7% 11.2% 13.3% 12.0% 12.0% 15.1%	11.6% 10.5% 13.9% 10.1% 13.1% 10.8% 11.3% 14.5% 10.7%	12.0% 11.2% 14.4% 11.6% 12.5% 13.4% 16.6% 13.1%	11.6% 10.6% 16.1% 12.1% 7.1% 11.7% 13.9% 16.5%	9.6% 15.0% 16.2% 12.5% 10.5% 1-1.6% 3.2%	62% 10.2% 12.4% 12.2% 11.3% 13.5% 7.1%	9.1% 1.1% 17.2% 12.3% 13.0% 11.7% 13.8% 5.2%	9.3% 113.4% 21.5% 16.7% 14.2% 8.9% 17.4% 3.2%	10.3% 7.9% 22.1% 14.9% 13.1% 11.9% 17.2% 2.2%	5.7% 4.5% 12.1% 7.1% 13.2% 13.2% 13.5% 5.0%	7.6% 6.7% 8.3% 4.2% 12.5% 7.6% 10.6% 11.8%	12.7% 8.5% 8.5% 7.9% 11.4% 8.3% 9.2% 7.7%	12.0% 110.3% 19.3% 19.3% 19.4% 116.6% 114.2% 11.6% 11.	13.2% 8.88% 8.88% 9.96% 7.1.9% 14.7% 11.1%	13.4% 1 11.14% 1 11.14% 1 10.03% 0 12.1% 1 12.1% 1 11.5% 6 14.3% 6 14.3% 6 11.19% 1	11.4% 7.76% 8.8.0% 9.99% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.50%	7.3% 8 84% 16 84% 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 4 % 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 1	8.2% 9.8 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.9.8% 10.9.8% 10.11.3% 11.3% 11.4% 11.3% 11.4% 12.2% 12.2% 13.5% 13.5% 12.2% 13.5% 13.5% 13.5% 12.2% 13.5% 13	9.5% 8.36% 7.11.3% 11.3% 9.11.3% 9.0% 6.0% 6.12.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3%	8.7% 11.0% 10.0% 10.0% 11.4% 12.3% 10.8% 12.3% 10.8% 13.3% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8%	12.5% 10.3% 9.0% 10.4% 6.0% 10.3% 7.3% 12.3% 7.3% 11.6% 8.0% 15.6% 10.5% 10.0% 11.2%	6% 8.4% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9% 9.8% 9.9% 9.8% 9.8	14% 8.0% 1.5% 9.0% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5	% 8 8 5% 8 8 5% % 8 8 5% % 8 8 5% % 9 8 5% % 9 8 5% % 9 5 5% % 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	9.5% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0% 11.5% 11.5% 12.0% 12.0% 14.0%
Average	12.4%	12.6%	11.7%	12.6%	12.2%	10.3%	11,1%	10.5%	12.3%	11.8%	9.3%	7.7%	8.8%	10.4%	%6.6	10.1% &	8.4%	8.3% 9	9.2% 9.	9.4% 9.	9.4% 11.	11.8% 9.3%	9.1%	% 8.3%	% 8-3%	10.0%
Median	12.0%	12.1%	11.1%	12.3%	11.7%	12.4%	11.3%	11.7%	13.4%	11.9%	8.8%	7.6%	8.4%	9.6%	9.5%	11.0%	8.3%	8.4% 9	9.1% 9.	9.9%	9.4% 12.	12.0% 9.2%	% 9.2%	%0.6 %3	% 8.8%	9.5%
American Electric Power Co Cleco Corp Great Plains Energy Hawaiian Electric industries 1DACORP Otter Tait Corp. Prinnacle West Cappital Prinnacle West Cappital Prinnacle West Cappital Prinnacle West Cappital Poriand General Electric Southern Company Westar Energy	11.1%. 14.0% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 13.1% 12.9% 11.2.9% 11.0%	11.9% 12.4% 12.4% 10.5% 10.5% 11.9% 12.0% 12.0% 11.8%	12.0% 12.9% 11.7% 11.1% 13.1% 15.1% 10.2% 10.2% 11.3% 11.3%	12.4% 13.4% 13.4% 13.4% 11.0% 12.5% 13.4% 13.0% 11.1%	13.2% 13.8% 19.6% 10.5% 10.5% 7.1% 14.7% 13.9% 10.4%	13.5% 12.8% 11.7% 10.9% 11.7% 11.9% 10.0% 10.7%	11.3% 13.5% 13.5% 13.5% 14.0% 14.0% 11.3% 12.3% 11.3%	10.5% 12.9% 8.4% 8.9% 11.1% 13.0% 14.7% 12.3% 9.1% 13.1% 5.2%	4.1% 16.0% 10.0% 10.0% 14.2% 9.8% 14.2% 12.4% 10.2% 11.1%	12.3% 14.6% 12.4% 12.4% 13.1% 15.1% 15.1% 17.8% 17.8% 17.8%	12.3% 13.5% 13.5% 11.9% 13.2% 15.2% 15.2% 15.2% 15.7% 11.4%	12.4% 11.5% 16.6% 11.1% 12.0% 12.0% 12.5% 12.6% 11.5%			2.2% 2.2% 3.3% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.1% 1.1%											10.0% 11.0% 18.5% 18.5% 11.5% 11.0% 10.0% 12.5% 9.5%
Median	11.1%	12.0%	11.7%	12.5%	11.4%	11.7%	11.6%	11.1%	12.4%	12.8%	12.3%	11.5%	10.8%	9.7%	9.6%	10.2%	6.9%	6.6% 8	8.3% B.	6.9% 9.	9.6% 11.	11.8% 10.	10.1% 8.3%	5% 9.0%	% 8 .5%	9.6%

Source: Calculations made from data contained in Value Line Investment Survey.

PROXY COMPANIES MARKET TO BOOK RATIOS

COMPANY	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	1992-2001 2 Average	2002-2008 20 Average /	2009-2012 Average
Parcell Proxy Group ALLETE Alliant Energy Avista Corp. Black Hills Corp. IDACORP MGE Energy Northwestern Energy Perco Holdings Portland General Electric TECO Eneregy Westar Energy	190% 151% 264% 155% 189% 115% 243% 178%	185% 163% 221% 172% 196% 125% 268% 152%	154% 133% 169% 146% 189% 135% 112% 224% 130%	152% 125% 185% 148% 183% 138% 140% 172%	154% 145% 198% 203% 241% 126% 169%	155% 162% 228% 177% 189% 151% 131% 154%	156% 163% 255% 177% 197% 161% 128% 185%	120% 152% 237% 158% 177% 166% 210% 89%	120% 317% 301% 189% 172% 139% 139% 119%	129% 114% 273% 185% 197% 124% 126%	110% 85% 143% 134% 214% 110% 135% 67%	97% 94% 134% 112% 223% 103% 111% 147%	322% 120% 111% 134% 207% 109% 174% 156%	212% 131% 115% 165% 122% 207% 122% 142% 138%	219% 155% 135% 139% 191% 160% 153% 153% 139% 182%	195% 173% 164% 132% 178% 141% 140% 179%	156% 131% 110% 104% 109% 115% 171% 171%	113% 102% 94% 77% 94% 1105% 1105% 131% 91%	127% 131% 106% 108% 113% 170% 172% 97% 111%	138% 119% 119% 119% 119% 138% 98% 172% 119%	136% 162% 123% 121% 123% 161% 111% 111% 133% 213%	152% 163% 168% 189% 150% 118% 159%	221% 131% 111% 145% 124% 118% 118% 119% 119%	129% 111% 104% 112% 177% 102% 102% 179%
Average	179%	182%	155%	161%	176%	176%	185%	162%	184%	161%	125%	126%	159%	171%	163%	159%	128%	106%	126%	136%	146%	170%	150%	128%
Median	169%	175%	150%	150%	169%	162%	177%	158%	172%	129%	129%	111%	133%	142%	154%	156%	120%	%86	118%	129%	135%	161%	135%	120%
Hevert Proxy Group American Electric Power Co Cleco Corp Empire District Electric Great Plains Energy Hawaiian Electric Industries IDACORP Otter Tail Corp. Pinnacle West Calpital PNIM Resources, Inc. Portland General Electric Southern Company Westar Energy	143% 177% 184% 160% 171% 116% 116% 115% 142%	159% 175% 178% 173% 173% 154% 126% 126% 180% 155%	143% 156% 143% 151% 141% 146% 207% 99% 112% 112% 161%	156% 162% 142% 142% 148% 213% 116% 116% 174% 174% 129%	176% 168% 143% 143% 158% 108% 108% 176% 176%	187% 171% 138% 198% 147% 177% 195% 167% 167%	191% 183% 168% 209% 154% 177% 198% 198% 128%	154% 172% 177% 177% 132% 158% 201% 143% 85% 85% 156%	147% 223% 183% 173% 127% 189% 221% 145% 94% 74% 74%	179% 224% 162% 185% 145% 185% 243% 154% 123% 172%	138% 154% 132% 163% 153% 134% 245% 116% 95% 67%	134% 134% 133% 198% 112% 209% 114% 93% 109%	155% 177% 144% 218% 179% 125% 130% 124% 132%	165% 177% 148% 189% 189% 130% 130% 142% 142%	161% 162% 149% 181% 192% 139% 178% 178% 153% 153% 153% 153%	190% 162% 150% 173% 132% 200% 127% 125% 140% 161%	145% 132% 1122% 116% 104% 101% 101% 101% 101%		118% 123% 127% 87% 140% 113% 120% 113% 118%	128% 151% 1128% 128% 150% 119% 125% 119% 119% 119%	134% 168% 124% 97% 164% 152% 117% 117% 133%	164% 1181% 1182% 1178% 1178% 1138% 1138% 1118%	154% 157% 176% 176% 170% 124% 195% 1131% 113% 113% 119%	123% 1147% 120% 87% 112% 112% 117% 117% 114%
Median	149%	15 <i>/</i> %	143%	149%	168%	16/%	%08L	158%	173%	1/9%	138%	133%	155%	165%	15/%	156%	118%	%/6	116%	124%	134%	162%	146%	118%

Source: Calculations made from data contained in Value Line Investment Survey.

STANDARD & POOR'S 500 COMPOSITE RETURNS AND MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIOS 1992 - 2012

YEAR	RETURN ON AVERAGE EQUITY	MARKET-TO BOOK RATIO
1992	12.2%	271%
1993	13.2%	272%
1994	16.4%	246%
1995	16.6%	264%
1996	17.1%	299%
1997	16.3%	354%
1998	14.6%	421%
1999	17.3%	481%
2000	16.2%	453%
2001	7.5%	353%
2002	8.4%	296%
2003	14.2%	278%
2004	15.0%	291%
2005	16.1%	278%
2006	17.0%	277%
2007	12.8%	284%
2008	3.0%	224%
2009	10.6%	187%
2010	14.2%	208%
2011	14.6%	208%
2012	13.5%	214%
Averages:		
1992-2001	14.7%	341%
2002-2008	12.4%	275%
2009-2012	13.2%	204%

Source: Standard & Poor's Analyst's Handbook, 2012 edition, page 1.

RISK INDICATORS

COMPANY	VALUE LINE SAFETY	VALUE LINE BETA	VALUE LINE FINANCIAL STRENGTH		S& P STOCK RANKING	
· .						
Parcell Proxy Group						
ALLETE	2	0.70	Α	4.00	. В	3.00
Alliant Energy	2	0.70	Α	4.00	В	3.00
Avista Corp.	2	0.70	Α	4.00	A-	3.67
Black Hills Corp	3	0.80	B+	3.33	В	3.00
IDACORP .	2	0.70	B++	3.67	B+	3.33
MGE Eneregy	1	0.60	Α	4.00	B+	3.33
Northwestern Energy	3	0.70	B+	3.33	NR	
Pepco Holdings	3	0.75	В	3.00	В	3.00
Portland General Electric	2	0.75	B++	3.67	NR	
TECO Eneregy	2	0.85	B++	3.67	; B	3.00
Westar Energy	2	0.75	B++	3.67	B+	3.33
Wisconsin Energy	_ 1	0.60	A	4.00	A	4.00
	2.1	0.72	B++	3.70	B+	3.27
Hevert Proxy Group						
American Electric Power Co	3	0.65	B++	3.67	В	3.00
Cleco Corp	1	0.65	Α	4.00	В	3.00
Empire District Electric	2	0.65	B++	3.67	B+	3.33
Great Plains Energy	3	0.80	B++	3.67	В	3.00
Hawaiian Electric Industries	2	0.70	B++	3.67	В	3.00
IDACORP	2	0.70	B++	3.67	B+	3.33
Otter Tail Corp.	3	0.90	B++	3.33	В	3.00
Pinnacle West Cajpital	1	0.70	Α	4.00	В	3.00
PNM Resources, Inc.	3	0.95	В	3.00	В	3.00
Portland General Electric	2	0.75	B++	3.67	NR	-
Southern Company	1	0.55	A	4.00	A-	3.67
Westar Energy	2	0.75	B++	3.67	B+	3.33
Average	2.1	0.73	B++	3.67	B+	3.15

RISK INDICATORS

GROUP	VALUE LINE SAFETY	VALUE LINE BETA	VALUE LINE FIN STR	S & P STK RANK
S & P's 500 Composite	2.7	1.05	B++	В
Parcell Proxy Group	2.1	0.72	B++	B+
Hevert Proxy Group	2.1	0.73	B++	B+

Sources: Value Line Investment Survey, Standard & Poor's Stock Guide.

Definitions:

Safety rankings are in a range of 1 to 5, with 1 representing the highest safety or lowest risk.

Beta reflects the variability of a particular stock, relative to the market as a whole. A stock with a beta of 1.0 moves in concert with the market, a stock with a beta below 1.0 is less variable than the market, and a stock with a beta above 1.0 is more variable than the market.

Financial strengths range from C to A++, with the latter representing the highest level.

Common stock rankings range from D to A+, with the later representing the highest level.

DELMARVA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY RATING AGENCY RATIOS

ltem	Percent	Cost	Weighted Cost	Pre-Tax Cost	
Long-Term Debt	50.78%	4.91%	2.49%	2.49%	
Common Equity	49.22%	9.35%	4.60%	7.67%	
Total	100.00%		7.09%	10.16%	— 1/

1/ Post-tax weighted cost divided by .60 (composite tax factor)

Pre-Tax coverage =

4.08 = (10.16% / 2.49%)

Standard & Poor's Utility Benchmark Ratios:

Business Profile of "3"

Α

BBB

Pre-tax coverage

2.8x - 3.4x

1.8x - 2.8x

Total debt to total capital

50%-55%

55%-65%

UPDATE OF DP&L WITNESS HEVERT'S DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSES

			,			;							;		Hignest
		Expected	Zacks		Expected	First Call		Expected	Value	Value		Expected	Highest		DCF
	Dividend	Dividend	EPS	Zacks	Dividend	EPS	First Call	Dividend	Line EPS	Line	Average	Dividend	EPS	Highest	Excl Extreme
	Yield	Yield	Growth	DCF	Yield	Growth	DCF	Yield	Growth	DCF	DCF	Yield	Growth	DCF	Values
	Ξ	(2)	(3)	4)	(2)	(9)	6	(8)	6)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
American Electric Power Co	4.15%	4.23%	3.87%	8.10%	4.23%	3.81%	8.04%	4.24%	4.50%	8.74%	8.30%	4.24%	4.50%	8.74%	8.74%
Cleco Corp	3.11%	3.23%	8.00%	11.23%	3.23%	8.00%	11.23%	3.19%	5.50%	8.69%	10.39%	3.23%	8.00%	11.23%	11.23%
Empire District Electric	4.39%	4.45%	3.00%	7.45%	4.45%	3.00%	7.45%	4.50%	5.00%	9.50%	8.14%	4.50%	2.00%	9.50%	9.50%
Great Plains Energy	3.74%	3.86%	6.19%	10.05%	3.86%	6.26%	10.12%	3.86%	6.50%	10.36%	10.18%	3.86%	6.50%	10.36%	10.36%
Hawaiian Electric Industries	4.76%	4.85%	3.70%	8.55%	4.82%	2.40%	7.22%	4.85%	3.50%	8.35%	8.04%	4.85%	3.70%	8.55%	8.55%
IDACORP	3.07%	3.14%	4.50%	7.64%	3.13%	4.00%	7.13%	3.10%	2.00%	5.10%	6.62%	3.14%	4.50%	7.64%	7.64%
Otter Tail Corp.	4.07%	4.19%	%00'9	10.19%	4.19%	6.00%	10.19%	4.51%	21.50%	26.01%	15.46%	4.51%	21.50%	26.01%	(16)
Pinnacle West Cajpital	3.84%	3.93%	4.59%	8.52%	3.95%	5.45%	9.40%	3.94%	5.00%	8.94%	8.95%	3.95%	5.45%	9.40%	9.40%
PNM Resources, Inc.	2.92%	3.02%	7.32%	10.34%	3.01%	6.43%	9.44%	3.09%	12.00%	15.09%	11.63%	3.09%	12.00%	15.09%	(17)
Portland General Electric	3.55%	3.66%	6.27%	9.93%	3.66%	6.52%	10.18%	3.61%	3.50%	7.11%	9.07%	3.66%	6.52%	10.18%	10.18%
Southern Company	4.48%	4.58%	4.44%	9.02%	4.58%	4.60%	9.18%	4.58%	4.50%	%80.6	%60'6	4.58%	4.60%	9.18%	9.18%
Westar Energy	4.18%	4.29%	5.07%	9.36%	4.26%	3.90%	8.16%	4.31%	8.00%	10.31%	9.28%	4.31%	6.00%	10.31%	10.31%
						-	3		1						
Average	3.85%	3.95%	5.25%	9.20%	3.95%	5.03%	8.98%	3.98%	6.63%	10.61%	9.59%	3.99%	7.36%	11.35%	9.51%
Median	3.96%	4.06%	4.83%	9.19%	4.07%	5.03%	9.29%	4.09%	2.00%	9.01%	9.08%	4.10%	5.73%	9.84%	9.45%

(1) Current annualized dividend rate divided by average of high and low stock price for the three-month period ended July 31, 2013, as shown on Exhibit DCP-7, page 1 of 4.

(2) Current dividend yield, from column (1), increased by one-half the EPS growth rate, as shown in column (3).

(3) Current Zacks EPS growth rates, using Zacks website as of August 12, 2013.

(4) DCF cost rate by combining columns (2) and (3).

. (5) Current dividend yield, from column (1), increased by one-half the EPS growth rate, as shown in column (6). (6) Current First Call EPS growth rates, using Yahoo! Finance website, as shown on Exhibit DCP-7, page 4 of 4.

(7) DCF cost rate by combining columns (5) and (6).

(8) Current dividend yield, from column (1), increased by one-half the EPS growth rate, as shown in column (9).

(9) Current Value Line EPS growth rate, as shown on Exhibit DCP-7, page 3.

(10) DCF cost rate by combining columns (8) and (9).

(11) Average of columns (4), (7), and (10).

(12) Current dividend yield, from column (1), increased by one-half the EPS growth rate, as shown in column (13).

(13) Highest EPS growth rate, from columns (3), (6), and (9).

(14) DCF cost rate by combining columns (12) and (13).

(15) Highest DCF cost rates excluding two companies that exhibit extreme and unstatainable values of EPS growth, as described in (16) and (17) below.

(16) Otter Tail Power has a Value Line projected EPS growth rate of 21.5%. This follows a five-year annual historic decline in EPS growth of 18.5%.

(17) PNM Resources has a Value Line projected EPS growth rate of 12.0%. This follows a five-year annual historic decline in EPS growth of 4.0%.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF) .		
DELMARVA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY)	PSC DOCKET NO. 13-115	
FOR AN INCREASE IN ELECTRIC BASE)		
RATES (Filed March 22, 2013))		

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 16, 2013 I caused the following to be served upon all parties on the attached service list in the manner indicated thereon.

- DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DAVID C. PARCELL ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE
- DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ANDREA C. CRANE ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE
- DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DAVID E. DISMUKES, PH.D. ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE

/s/ Regina A. Iorii

Regina A. Iorii (#2600)
Deputy Attorney General
Delaware Department of Justice
820 N. French Street, 4th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 577-8159
regina.iorii@state.de.us

Dated: August 16, 2013

SERVICE LIST DP&L ELECTRIC BASE RATE CASE PSC DOCKET No. 13-115

As of 7/3/13

BY ELECTRONIC & STATE MAIL

Mark Lawrence Hearing Examiner **Delaware Public Service Commission** 861 Silver Lake Boulevard, Suite 100

Dover, DE 19904 Tel: 302-736-7540 Fax: 302-739-4849

Email: mark.lawrence@state.de.us

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

James McC. Geddes, Esquire Ashby & Geddes 500 Delaware Avenue, Suite 800 P.O. Box 1150

Wilmington, DE 19899 302-654-1888 Tel: Fax: 302-654-2067

E-mail: jgeddes@ashby-geddes.com

jamesgeddes@mac.com

BY ELECTROINIC & STATE MAIL

Amy Woodward Public Utilities Analyst Delaware Public Service Commission 861 Silver Lake Boulevard, Suite 100 Dover, DE 19904

Tel: 302-736-7566 Fax: 302-739-4849

Email: amy.woodward@state.de.us

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

Lisa Driggins Public Utilities Analyst **Delaware Public Service Commission** 861 Silver Lake Boulevard, Suite 100 Dover, DE 19904

Tel: 302-736-7550 Fax: 302-739-4849

Email: lisa.driggins@state.de.us

BY ELECTRONIC & STATE MAIL

Patricia Gannon **Public Utilities Analyst**

Delaware Public Service Commission 861 Silver Lake Boulevard, Suite 100

Dover, DE 19904 Tel: 302-736-7552 Fax: 302-739-4849

Email: patricia.gannon@state.de.us

BY ELECTRONIC & STATE MAIL

Robert J. Howatt **Executive Director Delaware Public Service Commission** 861 Silver Lake Blvd, Suite 100 Dover, DE 19904

Tel: 302-736-7516 Fax: 302-739-4849

Email: robert.howatt@state.de.us

BY ELECTRONIC & STATE MAIL

Julie "Jo" Donoghue, Esq. **Deputy Attorney General** c/o Public Service Commission 861 Silver Lake Blvd, Suite 100

Dover, DE 19904

Tel: 302-736-7558 (Dover) Tel: 302-577-8348 (Wilmington) Fax: 302-739-4849 (Dover) Email: jo.donoghue@state.de.us

BY ELECTRONIC & STATE MAIL

Janis Dillard **Deputy Director** Delaware Public Service Commission 861 Silver Lake Blvd, Suite 100

Dover, DE 19904 Tel: 302-736-7542 Fax: 302-739-4849

Email: janis.dillard@state.de.us

SERVICE LIST DP&L ELECTRIC BASE RATE CASE PSC DOCKET No. 13-115

As of 7/3/13

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

Todd Goodman, Esq.
Associate General Counsel
Pepco Holdings, Inc. Legal Services
500 North Wakefield Drive
Mail Stop 92 DC 42
Newark, DE 19702

Tel: 302-429-3786 Fax: 302-429-3801

Email: todd.goodman@pepcoholdings.com

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

Pamela J. Scott, Esq. Associate General Counsel Pepco Holdings, Inc. Legal Services 500 North Wakefield Drive Mail Stop 92 DC 42 Newark, DE 19702

Tel: 302-429-3143 Fax: 302-429-3801

Email: pjscott@pepcoholdings.com

BY ELECTRONIC MAIL & HAND

David Bonar
Public Advocate
Division of the Public Advocate
820 North French Street, 4th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801

Tel: 302-577-5080 Fax: 302-577-3297

Email: david.bonar@state.de.us

BY ELECTRONIC MAIL & HAND

Ruth Ann Price Deputy Public Advocate Division of the Public Advocate 820 North French Street, 4th Floor Wilmington, DE 19801

Tel: 302-577-5014 Fax: 302-577-3297

Email: ruth.price@state.de.us

BY ELECTRONIC & STATE MAIL

Andrea B. Maucher Division of the Public Advocate John G. Townsend Building 401 Federal Street, Suite 3 (SOS)

Dover, DE 19901 Phone: (302) 857-4620 Fax: (302) 739-4111

Email: andrea.maucher@state.de.us

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

Jay C. Ziminsky Finance Manger Pepco Holdings, Inc. P.O. Box 9239 Mailstop 79NC59 Newark, DE 19714-9239

Tel: 302-454-4626 Fax: 302-283-6090

E-mail: jay.ziminsky@pepcoholdings.com

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

Heather G. Hall
Delmarva Power & Light Company
Regulatory Affairs
P.O. Box 9239
Mailstop 79NC59
Newark, DE 19714-9239

Tel: 302-454-4828 Fax: 302-454-4440

E-mail: heather.hall@pepcoholdings.com

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

Pamela Long
Delmarva Power & Light Company
Regulatory Affairs
P.O. Box 9239
Mailstop 79NC59
Newark, DE 19714-9239

Tel: 302-454-Fax: 302-454-4440

E-mail: pamela.long@pepcoholdings.com

SERVICE LIST DP&L ELECTRIC BASE RATE CASE PSC DOCKET No. 13-115 As of 7/3/13

Intervenors:

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

David T. Stevenson

Director, Center for Energy Competitiveness

Caesar Rodney Institute

P.O. Box 795

Dover, DE 19903

Tele: (302) 236-2050

Fax: (302) 645-9017

Email: davidstevenson@caesarrodney.org

BY ELECTRONIC & STATE MAIL

Thomas G. Noyes

Division of Energy & Climate

Delaware Department of Natural Resources and

Environmental Control

1203 College Park Drive, Suite 101

Dover, DE, 19904 Tel: 302-735-3356

Fax: 302-739-1840

E-mail: thomas.noyes@state.de.us

BY ELECTRONIC & STATE MAIL

Ralph K. Durstein III Deputy Attorney General

Carvel State Office Building

820 N. French St.

Wilmington, DE 19801

Tel: 302-577-8510

Fax: 302-577-5866

E-mail: ralph.durstein@state.de.us

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

Delaware Energy Users Group (DEUG)

Michael J. Quinan, Esquire

Christian & Barton, L.L.P.

909 East Main Street, Suite 1200

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Phone: 804-697-4149

Fax: 804-697-6149

E-mail: mquinan@cblaw.com

Consultants:

DPA/Attorney General:

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

Andrea C. Crane

Benjamin D. Cotton

The Columbia Group, Inc.

P.O. Box 810

Georgetown, CT 06829

Phone: (203) 438-2999

Fax: (203) 894-3274

E-mail: ctcolumbia@aol.com

Courier Delivery:

90 Grove Street, Suite 200

Ridgefield, CT 06877

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

David E. Dismukes, Ph.D

Acadian Consulting Group

5800 One Perkins Place, Ste. 5-F

Baton Rouge, LA 70808

Phone: (225) 769-2603

Fax: (225) 769-2608

E-mail: daviddismukes@acadianconsulting.com

Electronic Copies Only:

Kim Dismukes

kimdismukes@acadianconsulting.com

Alex Aguila

alexguila@acadianconsulting.com

Staff:

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

David C. Parcell

Technical Associates, Inc.

9030 Stony Point Parkway, Ste. 580

Richmond, VA 23235

Phone: (804) 644-4000

Fax: (804) 272-3598

E-mail: parcelld@tai-econ.com

SERVICE LIST DP&L ELECTRIC BASE RATE CASE PSC DOCKET No. 13-115 As of 7/3/13

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

David Peterson Chesapeake Regulatory Consultants 10351 S. Maryland Blvd., Ste. 202 Dunkirk, MD 20754 Phone: 410-286-0503

E-mail: davep@chesapeake.net

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

Gary B. Cohen
GBC Consulting
221 Hoyer Court
Wilmington, DE 19803
Phone: 302-529-7090

E-mail: garybcohen@aol.com

BY ELECTRONIC & REGULAR MAIL

Michael J. Majoros, Jr.
Dr. Karl Pavlovic
Mitch Semanik
Snavely King Majoros O'Connor & Lee
8100 Professional Place, Ste. 306
Landover, MD 20785
Phone: 202 371 0153

Phone: 202-371-9153 Fax: 202-842-4966

E-mail: mmajoros@snavely-king.com

kpavlovic@snavely-king.com msemanik@snavely-king.com